Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Proposed Amendments in Light of the Crime Victims\u27 Rights Act by Cassell, Paul G.
BYU Law Review
Volume 2005 | Issue 4 Article 1
11-1-2005
Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure: Proposed Amendments in
Light of the Crime Victims' Rights Act
Paul G. Cassell
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the
Criminal Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paul G. Cassell, Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Proposed Amendments in Light of the Crime Victims' Rights
Act, 2005 BYU L. Rev. 835 (2005).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2005/iss4/1
A_CASSELL.FIN 10/24/2005 6:31 PM 
 
835 
 
Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure: Proposed Amendments in Light of the 
Crime Victims’ Rights Act 
Paul G. Cassell.∗ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  Introduction ....................................................................... 837 
II.  The Missing Victims of Crimes............................................ 838 
 A. The Victim’s Absence from the Current Federal 
Criminal Rules ...................................................... 839 
 B. The Victims’ Rights Movement ............................. 840 
 C. The Crime Victims’ Rights Act .............................. 850 
III.  The Need To Place Victims’ Rights in the Rules.................. 852 
IV.  Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure To Implement the CVRA ................................... 856 
 Rule 1—Definition of “Victim”.................................. 856 
 Rule 2—Fairness to Victims in Construction .............. 858 
 (New) Rule 10.1 – Notice of Proceedings for Victims 859 
 Rule 11(a)(3)—Victims’ Views on Nolo Contendere 
Pleas ..................................................................... 865 
 Rule 11(b)(4)—Victims’ Right To Be Heard on Pleas 866 
 Rule 11(c)(1)—Prosecution To Consider Victims’ 
Views on Pleas. ..................................................... 868 
 Rule 11(c)(2)—Court To Be Advised of Victim 
Objections to Plea................................................. 869 
 Rule 12.1—Victim Addresses and Phone Numbers 
Not Disclosed for Alibi Purposes .......................... 872 
∗  Professor of Law for the S.J. Quinney College of Law of the University of Utah and 
United States District Court Judge for the District of Utah. Thanks to Doug Beloof, Janna 
Tucker Davis, Meg Garvin, Wendy Murphy, Judge James Orenstein, and Steve Twist; to my 
able law clerks Ann Bauer, Tim Conde, Tyler Green, Felise Thorpe Moll, Justin Starr, and 
Stewart Young; and especially to my wife Trish for all her support. I write this article as a law 
professor, not as a judge. It is not intended to comment on any pending cases and implies no 
positive commitment on legal issues that may arise in cases that come before me in my court. 
A_CASSELL.FIN 10/24/2005 6:31 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
836 
 Rule 15—Victims’ Right To Attend Pre-Trial 
Depositions........................................................... 874 
 Rule 17—Victims’ Right to Notice of Subpoena of 
Confidential Information ...................................... 875 
 Rule 18—Victims’ Interests Considered in Setting 
Place of Prosecution.............................................. 878 
 Rule 20—Victims’ Views Considered Regarding 
Consensual Transfer.............................................. 879 
 Rule 21—Victims’ Views Considered Regarding 
Transfer for Prejudice............................................ 880 
 Rule 23—Victims’ Views Considered Regarding 
Non-Jury Trial ...................................................... 884 
 Rule 32(a)—Deleting Old Definition of “Victim” ...... 886 
 Rule 32(c)(1)(B)—Presentence Report Considering 
Restitution in All Cases ........................................ 887 
 (New) Rule 32(c)(3)—Probation Officer To Seek 
Out Victim Information........................................ 889 
 Rule 32(d)(2)(B)—Presentence Report To Contain 
Victim Information .............................................. 891 
 Rule 32(e)—Prosecutor To Disclose Presentence 
Report to Victim................................................... 892 
 Rule 32(f), (h), (i)—Victim Opportunity To Object 
to Presentence Report........................................... 901 
 Rule 32(i)(4)—Conforming Amendment to Victims’ 
Right To Be Heard ............................................... 903 
 (New) Rule 43.1—Victims’ Right To Attend Trials.... 904 
 Rule 44.1—Discretionary Appointment of Counsel 
for Victim ............................................................. 912 
 Rule 46—Victims’ Right To Be Heard Regarding 
Defendant’s Release from Custody........................ 917 
 Rule 48—Victims’ Views on Dismissal To Be 
Considered ........................................................... 917 
 Rule 50—Victims’ Right to Proceedings Free From 
Unreasonable Delay .............................................. 918 
 Rule 51—Claiming Error Regarding Victims’ Rights.. 921 
 Rule 53—Closed-Circuit Transmission of 
Proceedings for Victims ........................................ 922 
 Rule 58—Victims and Petty Offenses ......................... 923 
V. Conclusion ............................................................................ 924 
A_CASSELL.FIN 10/24/2005 6:31 PM 
835] Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules  
 837 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Crime victims are virtually absent from the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. The sixty federal rules comprehensively cover 
every aspect of federal criminal proceedings—from initial appearance 
through preliminary hearing, arraignment, acceptance of pleas, trial, 
and sentencing. Yet the rules substantively mention victims only 
once, briefly recognizing the right of some victims to speak at 
sentencing.1 
The federal rules can no longer leave victims unmentioned. In 
October 2004, Congress passed and President Bush signed into law 
the Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna 
Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA).2 The 
CVRA transforms crime victims into participants in the criminal 
justice process by (among other things) guaranteeing them notice of 
court hearings, the right to attend those hearings, and the 
opportunity to testify at appropriate points in the process. These new 
victims’ rights will reshape the federal criminal justice system and 
force significant changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
to reflect the victim’s expanded role. This Article offers 
comprehensive proposals for changing the federal rules to both 
implement the CVRA and reflect sound public policy. The CVRA 
dictates changes like these to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure because only by integrating victims into the federal rules 
will Congress’s goal of making victims participants in the process be 
fully realized.  
This Article is divided into five parts. Following this 
introduction, Part II reviews the current absence of victims from the 
federal rules. Surprisingly, even where the rules cover issues of great 
concern to victims, victims somehow go unmentioned. Part II then 
discusses the crime victims’ rights movement and concludes with a 
brief sketch of the events leading to the CVRA’s enactment. 
 1. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(B); discussion infra note 3 and accompanying text.  
 2. Crime Victims’ Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2261 (2004) (codified 
at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (West 2004 & Supp. 2005)). The CVRA was part of a much larger 
piece of legislation that addressed a variety of subjects, known as the “Justice for All Act.” See 
generally Steven J. Twist, On the Wings of Their Angels: The Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, 
Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, Nila Lynn Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2005). 
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Part III discusses why it is necessary to amend the federal 
criminal rules to incorporate victims. Although the CVRA is a federal 
statute that automatically trumps any conflicting procedural rule, 
procedural rules drive day-to-day courtroom practices. Given that 
Congress was particularly concerned about integrating victims into 
the fabric of the criminal justice system, the Advisory Committee on 
Criminal Rules should amend the rules to directly reflect the CVRA’s 
requirements. 
Part IV provides a rule-by-rule analysis of the changes needed in 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to implement the CVRA. 
Of particular importance is new language protecting crime victims’ 
rights to be notified of and to be present and heard at public 
criminal proceedings. Congress should also implement the right to 
notice in a new rule mandating that prosecutors keep victims 
apprised of criminal proceedings. In addition, the rules should also 
reflect victims’ rights to attend court proceedings and to testify at 
bail, plea, and sentencing hearings. Part IV also discusses other 
significant changes needed to conform the rules to the CVRA: 
defining “victim,” giving victims notice before confidential 
information is subpoenaed, allowing victims to be heard before cases 
are transferred to remote districts, giving victims access to relevant 
parts of the pre-sentence report, permitting courts to appoint 
counsel for victims, and protecting the victim’s right to proceedings 
free from unreasonable delay. Part V contains a brief conclusion. 
II. THE MISSING VICTIMS OF CRIMES 
Crime victims are absent from the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Yet this is not because victims lack vital interests in 
criminal cases. As the CVRA recognizes, victims have vital concerns 
throughout the criminal process. This section recounts the absence 
of victims from the federal criminal rules, then contrasts that absence 
with the aims of the victims’ rights movement. The movement has 
argued successfully before state legislatures and Congress for the 
recognition of crime victims’ rights—with these efforts culminating 
in the passage of the CVRA, protecting crime victims’ rights in the 
federal system. 
A_CASSELL.FIN 10/24/2005 6:31 PM 
835] Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules  
 839 
 
A. The Victim’s Absence from the Current Federal Criminal Rules 
The sixty Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide the 
architecture for the entire federal criminal court process, including 
initial appearance, preliminary hearing, arraignment, acceptance of 
pleas, trial, and sentencing. One would expect that the rules would 
frequently mention crime victims, given the subjects—such as bail, 
scheduling, and restitution—that directly concern victims. Yet 
amazingly, the current rules substantively use the word “victim” only 
a single time. 
The single direct reference to victims is Rule 32(i)(4)(B), which 
directs that before imposing a sentence, “the court must address any 
victim of a crime of violence or sexual abuse who is present at 
sentencing and must permit the victim to speak or submit any 
information about the sentence.”3 The word “victim” appears in 
passing in only two other rules: Rule 12.4 requires the government 
to disclose to the court any organizational “victim,”4 and the 
heading of Rule 38(e) mentions “Restitution” and “Notice to 
Victims,” but the text of the rule does not contain the term 
“victim.”5 
Victims deserve far more than the single reference in Rule 32. 
While later parts of this Article work through the rules section-by-
section to illustrate where victims have been unfairly ignored,6 a few 
examples here will prove the point. The rules currently fail to give 
victims any right to be heard regarding whether a judge should 
accept a plea, even though the judge must evaluate the public 
interest in deciding whether to do so.7 The rules fail to require 
notice to victims before their confidential information is subpoenaed 
from third parties—such as schools or medical providers—even 
though victims have compelling privacy interests to protect.8 And the 
rules do not protect the victim’s right to attend trials, despite 
 3. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(B). 
 4. Id. at 12.4(a)(2). 
 5. Id. at 38(e) (mentioning “victim” in the heading of the rule). 
 6. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 7. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; discussion infra notes 148–53 and accompanying text. 
 8. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17; discussion infra notes 177–91, and accompanying text. 
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victims’ long history of having at least some protected interest in 
observing trials and other proceedings.9 
One provision conveniently encapsulates the surprising absence 
of victims from the rules: Rule 32(d)(2)(B). The drafters of this 
rule10 appear to have been so afraid to utter the word “victim” that 
they did not use the term even when describing the person harmed 
by a crime. Rule 32(d)(2)(B) directs that a presentence report 
contain “verified information, stated in a nonargumentative style, 
that assesses the financial, social, psychological, and medical impact 
on any individual against whom the offense has been committed.”11 
The phrasing of this provision is striking for several reasons. It 
eschews the straightforward term “victim,” preferring instead the 
obscuring phrase “individual against whom the offense has been 
committed.” The provision also uses the responsibility-obscuring 
passive voice in describing the individual “against whom” the offense 
has been committed, leaving the reader to wonder who might have 
committed that offense (the defendant, perhaps?). Interestingly, the 
provision requires that information about the victim be “verified.” 
Fair enough—until one realizes that the directly adjacent provision 
regarding information about the defendant lacks a similar verification 
requirement.12 Why would information about the victim need to be 
verified while information about the defendant would not? Finally, 
the provision requires that victim information be stated in a 
“nonargumentative” style. Again, the adjacent defendant’s provision 
contains no such direction.13 In short, even a rule that seemingly 
must mention victims—the rule dictating preparation of a 
presentence report describing the crime—manages to avoid 
mentioning the word. 
B. The Victims’ Rights Movement 
That victims are missing from the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure exemplifies their treatment in the modern American 
 9. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43; discussion infra notes 269–300 and accompanying text. 
 10. To be clear, Congress, not the Advisory Committee on Criminal Law and 
Procedure, drafted the language of this rule. See Victims of Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-473, 98 Stat. 2014 (1984) (directly amending Rule 32). 
 11. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(B) (emphasis added).  
 12. Id. at 32(d)(2)(A). 
 13. Id. 
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criminal justice system. As one commentator has described the 
situation, the victim is “seen at best as ‘the forgotten man’ of the 
system and, at wors[t], as being twice victimized, the second time by 
the very system to which he has turned for justice.”14 The absence of 
victims conflicts with “a public sense of justice keen enough that it 
has found voice in a nationwide victims’ rights movement.”15 
The crime victims’ rights movement developed in the 1970s 
because of a perceived imbalance in the criminal justice system. Led 
by feminist and civil rights activists, victims’ advocates argued that 
the criminal justice system had become preoccupied with defendants’ 
rights to the exclusion of crime victims’ legitimate interests.16 These 
advocates urged reforms to give more attention to victims’ concerns, 
including protecting the victim’s right to be notified of court 
hearings, to attend those hearings, and to be heard at appropriate 
points in the process. 
The victims’ rights movement received considerable impetus 
with the publication in 1982 of the Report of the President’s Task 
Force on Victims of Crime.17 The Task Force concluded that the 
criminal justice system “has lost an essential balance . . . . [T]he 
system has deprived the innocent, the honest, and the helpless of its 
protection . . . . The victims of crime have been transformed into a 
group oppressively burdened by a system designed to protect them. 
This oppression must be redressed.”18 The Task Force advocated 
 14. William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The 
Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 650 (1976). 
 15.  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 834 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). See generally DOUGLAS EVAN BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL & STEVE 
J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 29–37 (2005); Shirley S. Abrahamson, 
Redefining Roles: The Victims’ Rights Movement, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 517; Douglas Evan 
Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L. 
REV. 289 [hereinafter Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process]; Paul G. Cassell, Balancing 
the Scales of Justice, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373, 1380–82; Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the 
Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 MISS. L.J. 514 (1982); Erin Ana O’Hara, 
Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 229 (2005); William T. Pizzi & 
Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A Comparative Perspective on American 
Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 37 (1996). 
 16. See generally BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 15, at ch. 1; Douglas E. 
Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights: Standing, Remedy, and Review, 2005 BYU 
L. REV. 255 [hereinafter Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights]; Cassell, supra note 
15, at 1381–82. 
 17. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 114 (1982). 
 18. Id. 
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multiple reforms. It recommended that prosecutors assume the 
responsibility for keeping victims notified of all court proceedings 
and bringing to the court’s attention the victim’s view on such 
subjects as bail, plea bargains, sentences, and restitution.19 The Task 
Force also urged that courts receive victim impact evidence at 
sentencing, order restitution in most cases, and allow victims and 
their families to attend trials even if they are also called as witnesses.20 
In its most sweeping recommendation, the Task Force proposed a 
federal constitutional amendment to protect crime victims. The Task 
Force proposed adding to the Sixth Amendment’s protections for 
defendants’ rights a provision allowing crime victims to be present 
and heard: “Likewise, the victim, in every criminal prosecution shall 
have the right to be present and to be heard at all critical stages of 
judicial proceedings.”21 
In the wake of that recommendation, crime victims’ advocates 
considered how best to pursue a federal constitutional amendment 
that would protect victims’ rights throughout the country. 
Recognizing the difficulty of obtaining the consensus required to 
amend the United States Constitution, advocates decided to go to 
the states first to pursue state victims’ rights amendments. This 
“states-first” strategy 22 met with considerable success. To date, some 
thirty states have adopted victims’ rights amendments to their own 
state constitutions.23 While these amendments take various forms, 
Arizona’s amendment illustrates the types of rights typically 
protected. The Arizona constitutional provision gives victims the 
broad right to “be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to 
 19. Id. at 63. 
 20. Id. at 72–73. 
 21. Id. at 114. 
 22. See S. REP. NO. 108-191, at 3 (2004), as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.A.N. 
 23. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1; CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 
28; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16(a); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8(b); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b); 
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b); KAN. 
CONST. art. 15, § 15; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 25; MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 47; MICH. CONST. 
art. I, § 24; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 26(A); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28; 
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8(2); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22; N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 24; N.C. CONST. 
art. I, § 37; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10(a); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34; OR. CONST. art. I, §§ 
42–43; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 35; TEX. 
CONST. art. I, § 30; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A; WASH. CONST. art. 
1, § 35; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9(m). These amendments passed with overwhelming popular 
support. 
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be free from intimidation, harassment, or abuse, throughout the 
criminal justice process.”24 It also specifically confers a right to “be 
present at, and, upon request, to be informed of all criminal 
proceedings where the defendant has the right to be present.”25 The 
amendment further allows victims to be heard at bail, plea, and 
sentencing hearings.26 
The movement also successfully prodded the federal system to 
recognize victims’ rights. In 1982 Congress passed the first federal 
victims’ rights legislation, the Victim and Witness Protection Act 
(VWPA).27 The VWPA had three primary goals: (1) to expand and 
protect the role of victims and witnesses in the criminal justice 
process; (2) to ensure that the federal government used all available 
resources to protect and assist victims without infringing defendants’ 
constitutional rights; and (3) to provide a model for state and local 
legislation.28 Since passage of the VWPA, Congress has remained 
active in this area of the law, passing several acts further protecting 
victims’ rights, such as the Victims of Crime Act of 1984,29 the 
Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990,30 the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,31 the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,32 and the Victim Rights 
Clarification Act of 1997.33 Other federal statutes have been passed 
to deal with specialized victim situations such as child victims and 
witnesses.34 
 24. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(1). 
 25. Id. § 2.1(A)(3). 
 26. Id. § 2.1(A)(4). 
 27. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 28. Id.  
 29. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2170 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
10601–03 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 3013; id. § 3671). 
 30. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4820 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
10601, 10606–07). 
 31. Pub L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of U.S.C.). 
 32. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of U.S.C.). 
 33. Pub. L. No. 105-6, 111 Stat. 12 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3510). 
 34. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (protecting rights of child victim-witnesses); Pub L. No. 
101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990). 
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These statutes spawned guidelines for how federal prosecutors 
should treat crime victims. The VWPA required the Attorney 
General to develop guidelines for the Department of Justice.35 To 
implement this Act, the Attorney General developed guidelines 
designed to assist victims during the criminal justice process, 
mandating protocol, separate waiting areas at court, the prompt 
return of the victim’s property, and victim training for law 
enforcement personnel.36 The guidelines also directed that 
prosecutors notify victims about available services, major case events, 
consultations with the prosecutor, and the opportunity for 
consultation about the prosecution.37 In 2000, Attorney General 
Reno updated and expanded the guidelines. The revised guidelines 
heightened the notification requirements, requiring prosecutors and 
law enforcement agents to notify victims of important criminal 
justice events and to confer with victims about important decisions in 
the process.38 
Among the federal victims’ statutes, the Victims’ Rights and 
Restitution Act of 1990 is noteworthy. This Act purported to create 
a comprehensive list of victims’ rights in the federal criminal justice 
process. It commanded that “[a] crime victim has the following 
rights” and then listed various procedural rights, including the right 
to “be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity 
and privacy,”39 to “be notified of court proceedings,”40 to “confer 
with [the] attorney for the Government in the case,”41 and to attend 
court proceedings even if called as a witness.42 The statute also 
directed the Justice Department to make “its best efforts” to ensure 
 35. Victim and Witness Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 6(a), 96 Stat. 1248, 
1252 (1982).  
 36. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., ATTORNEY GENERAL 
GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE (1995). 
 37. Id. 
 38.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., ATTORNEY GENERAL 
GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE 31–37 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 A.G. 
GUIDELINES]. The Guidelines were recently revised. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR 
VICTIMS OF CRIME, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS 
ASSISTANCE (2005) [hereinafter 2005 A.G. GUIDELINES].  
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b)(1) (repealed 2004). 
 40. Id. § 10606(b)(3) (repealed 2004). 
 41. Id. § 10606(b)(5) (repealed 2004). 
 42. Id. § 10606(b)(4) (repealed 2004). Testifying victims can attend proceedings unless 
the victim’s testimony “would be materially affected” by hearing other testimony at trial. Id.  
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that victims’ rights were protected.43 Yet this federal statute never 
successfully integrated victims into the federal criminal justice process 
and instead became something of a dead letter. Because Congress 
passed the CVRA in 2004 to remedy the problems with the 1990 
Act, a brief review of the law’s shortcomings is valuable. 
Curiously, the 1990 Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act was 
codified in Title 42 of the United States Code—the Title dealing 
with “Public Health and Welfare.” Such placement effectively limited 
the Act’s effectiveness because federal practitioners reflexively consult 
Title 18, the Title that covers “Crimes and Criminal Procedure,”44 
for guidance on criminal law issues. More prosaically, federal criminal 
enactments are bound together in a single West publication entitled 
the Federal Criminal Code and Rules. This publication is carried to 
court by prosecutors and defense attorneys and is on the desk of 
most federal judges. Because West Publishing never included the 
Victims’ Rights Act in this book, the statute was essentially unknown 
even to experienced judges and attorneys.45 
The prime illustration of the ineffectiveness of the Victims’ 
Rights and Restitution Act comes from the Oklahoma City bombing 
case.46 While one might expect victims’ rights would have been fully 
protected during such a high profile trial, in fact victims were denied 
one fundamental right: the right to observe court proceedings. 
During a pretrial motion hearing, the district court sua sponte 
precluded any victim who wished to provide victim impact testimony 
at sentencing from observing proceedings in the case.47 The court 
based its ruling on Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence—the 
so-called “Rule on Witnesses.”48 Thirty-five victims and survivors of 
 43. Id. § 10606(a) (repealed 2004). 
 44. 18 U.S.C. (2000). 
 45. Last year, I wrote a letter to West Publishing requesting that they include the law in 
their book. That request became moot with the passage of the CVRA, which moved victims’ 
rights from obscurity in Title 42 to centrality in Title 18, thereby guaranteeing them a spot in 
the West publication. 
 46. See generally Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the 
Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479, 515–22 (discussing the Oklahoma City 
bombing case in greater detail).  
 47. See United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68, 1996 WL 366268, at *2 (D. Colo. 
June 26, 1996).  
 48. Id. at *2–3 (discussing application of FED. R. EVID. 615). 
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the bombing then filed a motion for reconsideration.49 They noted 
that the district court apparently had overlooked the Victims’ Rights 
Act giving victims the right “to be present at all public court 
proceedings related to the offense, unless the court determines that 
testimony by the victim would be materially affected if the victim 
heard other testimony at trial.”50 The district court denied the 
motion for reconsideration.51 It concluded that victims present 
during court proceedings would not be able to separate the 
“experience of trial” from “the experience of loss from the conduct 
in question,” and, thus, their testimony at a sentencing hearing 
would be inadmissible.52 Unlike the original ruling, which was 
explicitly premised on Rule 615, the later ruling was more 
ambiguous, alluding to concerns under the Constitution, the 
common law, and the rules of evidence.53  
The victims subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandamus in 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit seeking review of 
the district court’s ruling.54 Three months later, a Tenth Circuit 
panel rejected the victims’ claims.55 The circuit found “a number of 
problems with the excluded witnesses’ reliance on the Victims’ 
Rights Act.”56 Indeed, the circuit found that the Act created no 
obligations for courts: 
 49. Motion of Marsha and Tom Kight et al. and the National Organization for Victim 
Assistance Asserting Standing To Raise Rights Under the Victims’ Bill of Rights and Seeking 
Leave To File a Brief as Amici Curiae, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68-M, 1996 WL 
570841 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 1996). I represented a number of the victims on this matter on a 
pro bono basis, along with able co-counsel Robert Hoyt, Arnon Siegel, and Karan Bhatia of 
the Washington, D.C. law firm of Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering, and Sean Kendall of Boulder, 
Colorado. 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b)(4) (1994) (repealed 2004). The victims also relied on a 
similar provision found in the authorization for closed circuit broadcasting of the trial, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 10608(a) (West Supp. 1998), and on a First Amendment right of access to public 
court proceedings. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577 (1980) 
(finding First Amendment right of court access). 
 51. McVeigh, 1996 WL 366268 at *25.  
 52. Id. at *24. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Kight et al. v. Matsch, No. 96-1484 (10th Cir. 
Nov. 6, 1996) (on file with author). 
 55. United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325, 328 (10th Cir. 1997), superseded by 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3510. 
 56. Id. at 334–35. 
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The statute charily pledges only the “best efforts” of certain 
executive branch personnel to secure the rights listed. The district 
court judge, a judicial officer not bound in any way by this pledge, 
could not violate the Act. Indeed, the Act’s prescriptions were 
satisfied once the government made its arguments against 
sequestration—before the district court even ruled.57 
Efforts by both the victims and the Department of Justice to obtain a 
rehearing were unsuccessful,58 despite the support of separate briefs 
urging such a rehearing from forty-nine members of Congress, all six 
Attorneys General in the Tenth Circuit, and some of the leading 
victims’ groups in the nation.59 
In the meantime, the victims, supported by the Oklahoma 
Attorney General’s Office, sought remedial legislation in Congress 
clearly providing that victims should not have to decide between 
testifying at sentencing or watching the trial. A bill was introduced 
to provide that watching a trial in a capital case does not constitute 
grounds for denying a victim the chance to provide an impact 
statement. In a matter of weeks, Congress passed the Victims Rights 
Clarification Act of 1997,60 but even that specific statute failed to 
protect the bombing victims’ rights. The district court in the 
Oklahoma City case found that the statute had constitutional 
problems.61 
Because of the difficulty accompanying the statutory protection 
of victims’ rights, victims advocates decided to press for a federal 
constitutional amendment. They argued that the statutory 
 57. Id. at 335 (internal citation omitted). 
 58. See Order, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-1469, 1997 WL 128893, at *3 (10th 
Cir. Mar. 11, 1997). 
 59. See Brief for Amici Curiae Washington Legal Foundation and United States Senator 
Don Nickles and 48 Other Members of Congress, United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325 
(10th Cir. Feb. 14, 1997) (No. 96-1469); Brief for Amici Curiae States of Oklahoma, 
Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming Supporting the Suggestion for 
Rehearing and the Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc by the Oklahoma City Bombing Victims 
and the United States, United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325 (10th Cir. Feb. 14, 1997) 
(No. 96-1469); Brief for Amici Curiae National Victims Center, Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving, National Victims’ Constitutional Amendment Network, Justice for Surviving Victims, 
Inc., Concerns of Police Survivors, Inc., and Citizens for Law and Order, Inc., in Support of 
Rehearing, United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325 (10th Cir. Feb. 17, 1997) (No. 96-
1469). 
 60. Pub. L. No. 105-6, 111 Stat. 12 (1997).  
 61. See generally Cassell, supra note 46, at 519–20 (recounting problems). 
A_CASSELL.FIN 10/24/2005 6:31 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
848 
 
protections could not sufficiently guarantee victims’ rights. In their 
view, such statutes “frequently fail to provide meaningful protection 
whenever they come into conflict with bureaucratic habit, traditional 
indifference, [or] sheer inertia.”62 As the Justice Department 
reported: 
[E]fforts to secure victims’ rights through means other than a 
constitutional amendment have proved less than fully adequate. 
Victims’ rights advocates have sought reforms at the state level for 
the past [twenty] years, and many states have responded with state 
statutes and constitutional provisions that seek to guarantee 
victims’ rights. However, these efforts have failed to fully safeguard 
victims’ rights. These significant state efforts simply are not 
sufficiently consistent, comprehensive, or authoritative to safeguard 
victims’ rights.63 
To place victims’ rights in the Constitution, victims advocates—
led most prominently by the National Victims Constitutional 
Amendment Network64—approached the President and Congress 
regarding a federal amendment.65 On April 22, 1996, Senators Kyl 
and Feinstein with the backing of President Clinton introduced a 
federal victims’ rights amendment.66 The amendment was intended 
to “restore, preserve, and protect, as a matter of right for the victims 
of violent crimes, the practice of victim participation in the 
administration of criminal justice that was the birthright of every 
American at the founding of our Nation.”67 A companion resolution 
was introduced in the House of Representatives.68 The proposed 
amendment embodied seven core principles: (1) the right to notice 
of proceedings, (2) the right to be present at the proceedings, (3) 
the right to be heard, (4) the right to notice of the defendant’s 
 62. Laurence H. Tribe & Paul G. Cassell, Embed the Rights of Victims in the 
Constitution, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1998, at B5. 
 63. Focusing on the Administration of Justice and the Enforcement of Laws: Dep’t of 
Justice Oversight Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. 23–24 (1997) 
(statement of Janet Reno, Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
 64. See http://www.nvcan.org. See generally Twist, supra note 2. 
 65. For a comprehensive history of victims’ efforts to pass a constitutional amendment, 
see Twist, supra note 2. 
 66. S.J. Res. 52, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). 
 67. S. REP. NO. 108-191, at 1–2 (2003); see also S. REP. NO. 106-254 (2000).  
 68. H.R.J. Res. 174, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). 
A_CASSELL.FIN 10/24/2005 6:31 PM 
835] Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules  
 849 
 
release or escape, (5) the right to restitution, (6) the right to a 
speedy trial, and (7) the right to reasonable protection. In a later 
resolution, an eighth principle was added: the right to standing to 
enforce these rights.69 The 104th Congress did not pass the 
amendment. 
On January 21, 1997, the opening day of the first session of the 
105th Congress, Senators Kyl and Feinstein reintroduced the 
victims’ rights amendment.70 A series of hearings were held that year 
in both the House and the Senate.71 Kyl and Feinstein reintroduced 
the amendment the following year.72 The Senate Judiciary 
Committee held hearings73 and passed the proposed amendment out 
of committee.74 Yet again, the full Senate did not consider the 
amendment. 
In 1999, Senators Kyl and Feinstein again proposed the 
amendment,75 and on September 30, 1999, the Judiciary Committee 
voted, as before, to send the amendment to the full Senate.76 But on 
April 27, 2000, after three days of floor debate, the amendment was 
shelved when it became clear that its opponents, who objected to 
constitutionalizing victims’ rights, possessed the necessary votes to 
sustain a filibuster.77 At the same time, hearings on the companion 
measure were held in the House.78 
Discussions about the Amendment began again soon after the 
2000 presidential elections. On April 15, 2002, Senators Kyl and 
Feinstein reintroduced the Amendment in the Senate,79 and the 
following day, President Bush announced his support.80 On May 1, 
 69. See S.J. Res. 65, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). 
 70. S.J. Res. 6, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). 
 71. See, e.g., Victims’ Rights Amendment: Hearings Before the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 
105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1997).  
 72. S.J. Res. 44, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). 
 73. Victim’s Rights Amendment: Hearings Before the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 105th 
Congress (1998).  
 74. See 144 CONG. REC. S11,010 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1998) (statement of Sen. Kyl).  
 75. S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999). 
 76. 146 CONG. REC. S2966 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2000).  
 77. See id. 
 78. H.R.J. Res. 64, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (2002). 
 79. S.J. Res. 35, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002). 
 80. 149 CONG. REC. S82 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
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2002, a companion measure was proposed in the House.81 On 
January 7, 2003, Senators Kyl and Feinstein proposed the 
amendment as Senate Judiciary Resolution 1. The Senate Judiciary 
Committee held hearings in April of that year,82 followed by a 
written report supporting the Amendment.83 Shortly thereafter, a 
motion to proceed to consideration of the measure was withdrawn 
when proponents determined they did not have the sixty-seven votes 
necessary to pass the amendment. After it became clear that the 
necessary super-majority votes to amend the Constitution were not 
attainable, victims’ advocates turned their attention to enacting a 
comprehensive victims’ rights statute. 
C. The Crime Victims’ Rights Act 
The Crime Victims’ Rights Act ultimately resulted from a 
decision by the victims’ movement to seek a more comprehensive 
and enforceable federal statute rather than to continue pursuing the 
more ambitious goal of a federal constitutional amendment. In April 
2004, victims advocates met with Senators Kyl and Feinstein to 
decide whether to push yet again for a federal constitutional 
amendment. Conceding that the amendment had only majority 
support in Congress rather than the necessary super-majority, the 
advocates decided to press for a far-reaching federal statute 
protecting victims’ rights in the federal criminal justice system.84 In 
exchange for backing off from the federal amendment in the short 
term, victims’ advocates received near-universal congressional 
support for a “broad and encompassing” statutory victims’ bill of 
rights.85 This new approach not only established a string of victims’ 
rights but also provided funding for victims’ legal services and 
created remedies for the violation of victims’ rights.86 The victims’ 
 81. H.R.J. Res. 91, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002). 
 82. A Proposed Constitutional Amendment To Protect Crime Victims: Hearing on S.J. 
Res. 1 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 108th Congress, 108–189 (2003).  
 83. S. REP. NO. 108-191 (2003).  
 84. See Twist, supra note 2. 
 85. 150 CONG. REC. S4261 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
 86. Id. at S4263 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
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movement is currently evaluating the success of the statute before 
deciding whether to continue pushing for a federal amendment.87 
The Crime Victims’ Rights Act gives victims “the right to 
participate in the system.”88 To facilitate such participation, the Act 
grants victims eight specific rights: 
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused; 
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any 
public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the 
crime or of any release or escape of the accused; 
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court 
proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing 
evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be 
materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that 
proceeding; 
(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in 
the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole 
proceeding; 
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the 
Government in the case; 
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law; 
(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay; 
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the 
victim’s dignity and privacy.89 
Rather than relying merely on the “best efforts” of prosecutors 
to vindicate rights, the CVRA also contains specific enforcement 
 87. Id. (statement of Sen. Feinstein); see also Att’y Gen. Alberto R. Gonzales, Prepared 
Remarks at the Hoover Inst. Bd. of Overseers Conference (Feb. 28, 2005) (indicating that a 
federal victims’ rights amendment remains a priority for President Bush), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2005/02282005_agremarkshov.htm. 
 88. 150 CONG. REC. S4263 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). For 
a description of victim participation, see Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process, supra 
note 15. 
 89. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).  
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mechanisms.90 Most importantly, it directly gives victims standing to 
assert their rights, addressing a flaw in the earlier enactment.91 The 
Act provides that rights can be “assert[ed]” by “[t]he crime victim, 
the crime victim’s lawful representative, and the attorney for the 
Government.”92 The victim or the government may appeal any 
denial of a victim’s right through a writ of mandamus on an 
expedited basis.93 The courts are also required to “ensure that the 
crime victim is afforded the rights” in the new law.94 
These changes were intended to make the victim “an 
independent participant in the proceedings.”95 Congress desired to 
modify what it viewed as the unfair treatment of crime victims; in 
particular, congressional sponsors of the CVRA cited the Oklahoma 
City bombing case as the kind of decision that they intended the 
new law to overrule.96 
III. THE NEED TO PLACE VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN THE RULES 
 With the CVRA in place as the law of the land, the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure should be amended to conform to the 
statute. While one court has derisively referred to the Act as mere 
“mushy, feel good legislation,”97 it in fact substantively changes the 
posture of crime victims on a whole host of issues. In the wake of the 
Act, victims now must be folded into the process through which 
federal courts conduct criminal cases, including bail, plea, trial, and 
sentencing hearings. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure—the 
“playbook” of the federal courts—should reflect this fact. 
 Some might agree that victims now have a number of new 
rights, but nonetheless dispute the need for a rules amendment. 
After all, it might be argued, the CVRA in fact creates substantive 
rights for crime victims. Because nothing in the federal procedural 
 90. Id. § 3771(d). 
 91. Cf. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights, supra note 16 (identifying the 
lack of victim standing as a pervasive flaw in victims’ rights enactments). 
 92. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(1). 
 93. Id. § 3771(d)(3). 
 94. Id. § 3771(b). 
 95. 150 CONG. REC. S10911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 96. Id. at S4269 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).  
 97. United States v. Holland, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1279 (N.D. Ala. 2005). 
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rules can modify substantive rights,98 the CVRA will trump any 
conflicting provision in the federal rules.99 In other words, the CVRA 
will automatically govern federal criminal proceedings even if the 
rules remain as written. 
While this argument is legally precise, as a practical matter, 
compelling reasons justify amending the federal rules to include 
victims. Congress intended that the CVRA’s new rights not be 
“simply words on paper,” but rather “meaningful and functional” 
reforms.100 To that end, Congress mandated that courts shall 
“ensure” that crime victims are “afforded the rights” conveyed by 
the CVRA.101 To effectively ensure that victims’ rights are protected, 
these rights must become part of the warp and woof of the criminal 
process. That can occur only if the federal rules—the day-to-day 
operations manual of the courts—spell out how to integrate victims 
into the process. 
Judges and practitioners frequently refer to the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure for guidance as to how to conduct hearings. If 
victims’ rights are left out of the federal rules, the strong possibility 
exists that courts may mistakenly disregard victims’ rights under the 
CVRA. A good illustration comes from Rule 11, which spells out in 
some detail how judges should conduct a hearing accepting a plea. 
The judge is required to personally inform the defendant of certain 
specified rights and ensure that the defendant understands he will be 
waiving those rights.102 The judge must also determine that the 
defendant is voluntarily entering the plea and that there is a factual 
basis for the guilty plea.103 Under the CVRA, victims now also have 
the right to be heard before the judge accepts any plea.104 This is a 
new right,105 which judges are not accustomed to administering. 
Unless the victim’s right to be heard is specifically spelled out in Rule 
11’s plea procedures, some judges may inadvertently disregard it. 
 98. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000). 
 99. See, e.g., Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 100. 150 CONG. REC. S4262 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
 101. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). 
 102. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1). 
 103. Id. at 11(b)(2), (b)(3). 
 104. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4). 
 105. Cf. 42 U.S.C. 10606(b) (listing victims’ rights; right to be heard at pleas not 
included) (repealed by 18 U.S.C. § 3771). 
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The Oklahoma City bombing case further demonstrates how 
courts sometimes blindly follow the federal rules without considering 
superseding statutes. In that case, the court excluded victim-
witnesses from certain proceedings, relying solely on Federal Rule of 
Evidence 615 in making its determination. In denying the witnesses 
entrance to the proceedings, the court was apparently unaware of the 
provision in the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act protecting a 
victim’s right to attend.106 This deficiency was called to the attention 
of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence.107 The 
committee acknowledged the need to include victims in the evidence 
rules and later added a new provision reflecting the victim’s right to 
attend.108 
One reason for including victims’ rights in the rules is to avoid 
litigation about the negative inferences that might be drawn if 
victims’ rights are not in the rules. It is a well-settled principle of 
statutory construction that expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the 
expression of one thing implies the exclusion of the other). This 
canon of construction applies to the federal rules as much as to 
statutes.109 Because the rules repeatedly spell out situations in which 
the defendant has the right to have his interests considered but say 
nothing about victims, it might be argued that the rules have 
implicitly determined that a victim’s interests are irrelevant. To 
return to the Rule 11 plea example, given that the criminal rules 
specify that a court must address the defendant but lack any 
comparable requirement for victims, it might be inferred that victims 
cannot speak at plea hearings. Any such conclusion would be 
contrary to the plain language of the CVRA.110 To avoid possible 
confusion, the rules should be clear on this point. 
An additional reason for integrating victims into the federal rules 
is that Congress seemingly expects this to happen. Congress adopted 
the CVRA with the express goal of making the new law “a formula 
 106. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 107. See Letter from Paul G. Cassell to Advisory Comm. (on file with author). 
 108. See FED. R. EVID. 615 advisory committee’s notes (1998 Amendments). 
 109. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination 
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 
 110. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4) (Victims have “the right to be . . . heard” at any public 
proceeding “involving . . . [a] plea.”). 
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for success” and a “model for our States.”111 Congress clearly wants 
the new law aggressively implemented, thereby avoiding the need for 
further legislative action or even, possibly, a federal constitutional 
amendment. Congress is watching to see whether the Judiciary (and 
the Executive) will fully and fairly implement this new Act. As 
Senator Leahy warned, “Passage of this bill will necessitate careful 
oversight of its implementation by Congress.”112 
Construing the CVRA to require changes is also appropriate 
because the Act is remedial legislation. As the Supreme Court has 
instructed, “When Congress uses broad generalized language in a 
remedial statute, and that language is not contravened by 
authoritative legislative history, a court should interpret the provision 
generously so as to effectuate the important congressional goals.”113 
The congressional sponsors described the victims’ rights in the 
CVRA as “broad rights,”114 the significance of which should not “be 
whittled down or marginalized by the courts or the executive 
branch. This legislation is meant to correct, not continue, the legacy 
of the poor treatment of crime victims in the criminal process.”115 
A final reason for amending the rules is that crime victims’ 
groups are looking for the effective implementation of the CVRA. 
They are urging that the federal rules be comprehensively amended 
to reflect victims’ rights; indeed, they have even suggested that 
Congress should directly amend the federal rules to include victims’ 
rights.116 The Judiciary would be well advised not to ignore these 
lobbying efforts. Victims have proven very effective at advancing 
legislation in Congress, particularly where they have legitimate 
grievances about how they have been treated.117  
 Moreover, allowing the initiative for drafting of rules to pass 
from the Judiciary to Congress is not ideal. The Advisory Committee 
on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure includes many skilled 
 111. 150 CONG. REC. S4262 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
 112. Id. at S4271 (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 113. California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 279 n.4 (1990) (quoting Cia. Petrolera 
Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 428 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 114. 150 CONG. REC. S4269 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 115. Id. (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
 116. Interview with Steve J. Twist, Nat’l Victims’ Constitutional Amendment Network 
(March 11, 2005).  
 117. See supra notes 27–34 and accompanying text (recounting victims’ legislation passed 
by Congress).  
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members with considerable experience in drafting rules. The 
Committee is well aware of the CVRA. Shortly after the passage of 
the CVRA, the Committee withdrew a modest victim amendment it 
was proposing in anticipation of the need to make more extensive 
changes,118 and is already working on proposed amendments to the 
rules.119 It is preferable to have victims integrated into the federal 
rules through careful drafting by the Committee rather than by the 
potentially blunderbuss approach of direct congressional action. 
For all these reasons, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
should be comprehensively amended to recognize the interests of 
crime victims and thereby to allow victims to be full participants in 
the criminal process. 
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE TO IMPLEMENT THE CVRA 
With the goal of effectively implementing the CVRA firmly in 
mind, the remainder of this Article proposes twenty-eight specific 
rule changes for consideration by the Advisory Committee on 
Criminal Rules. The individual sections that follow first recite a 
specific proposed change followed by the rationale for that change as 
both a matter of law and of policy. For convenience, this Article 
discusses the proposed changes sequentially, beginning with Rule 1. 
Rule 1—Definition of “Victim” 
The Proposal: 
Rule 1 should be amended to include the following definition of 
a victim: 
“Victim” means a person directly and proximately harmed as a 
result of the commission of a federal offense or an offense in the 
District of Columbia. In the case of a crime victim who is under 18 
years of age, incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased, the legal 
guardians of the crime victim or the representatives of the crime 
victim’s estate, family members, or any other persons appointed as 
 
 118. See infra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 119. Telephone interview with Judge Susan C. Bucklew, Chair, Adv. Comm. on Fed. 
Rules of Criminal Procedure (May 2005).  
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suitable by the court, may assume the crime victim’s rights under 
these rules, but in no event shall the defendant be named as such 
guardian or representative. 
The Rationale: 
The CVRA directly defines “victim” using this language,120 which 
ought to be folded into the rules for convenience. The rules 
currently define such terms as “attorney for the government,” 
“federal judge,” and “petty offense.”121 “Victim” should likewise be 
defined. 
A definition is required for a second reason: Rule 32 currently 
contains a differing definition of “victim” as “an individual against 
whom the defendant committed an offense for which the court will 
impose sentence.”122 Because that definition varies from that 
mandated by the CVRA, it must be changed. Furthermore, the 
CVRA’s definition comes with an interpretative history.123 The 
CVRA’s definition of “victim” is taken almost verbatim from the 
1996 Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA).124 In turn, the 
MVRA drew on the 1982 Victim Witness Protection Act (VWPA).125 
As a result, the CVRA uses a definition of “victim” that is more than 
twenty-two years old and that has not produced major administrative 
or definitional problems. Courts will be able to draw from that 
history to determine who qualifies as a “victim.”126 
 
 120. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(e) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005).  
 121. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1(b)(1), 1(b)(3), 1(b)(8).  
 122. Id. at 32(a)(2).  
 123. See generally BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 15, at 49–69 (reviewing 
different definitions of “victim” for purposes of crime victims’ legislation). 
 124. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). For differences from the old law, see Twist, supra 
note 2. 
 125. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2). 
 126. See, e.g., Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990) (holding that VWPA 
limited “victim” to victims of the actual offense of conviction so that district court could not 
order restitution on basis of charges that were dropped as part of plea agreement); United 
States v. Follet, 269 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a free clinic was not a “victim” of 
the defendant’s rape of his niece); Moore v. United States, 178 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that a bank customer was “victim” of attempted bank robbery under MVRA where 
defendant pointed a sawed-off shotgun at the customer and the teller, who were standing only 
two feet apart, while demanding money), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 943 (1999); United States v. 
Sanga, 967 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that foreign national who conspired to be 
brought into United States illegally was still a “victim” of the conspiracy where her smuggler 
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Rule 1 also appears to be the best place to include the CVRA’s 
language about a “representative” of a victim. This language, too, 
draws from the restitution statutes.127 
Rule 2—Fairness to Victims in Construction 
The Proposal: 
Rule 2 should be amended to require fairness to victims in 
construing the rules as follows: 
These rules are to be interpreted to provide for the just 
determination of every criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in 
procedure and fairness in administration to the government, 
defendants, and victims, and to eliminate unjustifiable expense and 
delay. 
The Rationale: 
The CVRA broadly mandates that victims have the right to “be 
treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and 
privacy.”128 This creates a substantive right to fairness, similar to that 
found in various state victims’ rights amendments—including the 
  
threatened her life and forced her to work as live-in maid once she had arrived); United States 
v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (D. Utah 2004) (holding that “victim” in manslaughter 
case under MVRA was murdered person himself and not the estate), rev’d on other grounds, 
United States v. Serawop, 410 F.3d 656 (10th Cir. 2005). See generally John F. Wagner, Jr., 
Annotation, Who Is a “Victim,” So as To Be Entitled to Restitution Under Victim and Witness 
Protection Act, 108 A.L.R. FED. 828 (2005).  
A few new issues will need to be litigated. For example, the Hughey case noted above 
conflicts with the views of Senator Jon Kyl, co-sponsor of the CVRA, who explained that the 
definition of “victim” in the CVRA is an intentionally broad definition because “all victims of 
crime deserve to have their rights protected, whether or not they are the victim of the count 
charged.” See 150 CONG. REC. S10,910-01 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
At least one court has suggested that, as a matter of discretion, it is desirable to notify even 
victims of uncharged conduct under the CVRA. See United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 
319, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (concluding that, absent reason to think otherwise, any person who 
the government asserts has been harmed by a crime or who self-identifies as such qualifies as a 
“victim”); cf. In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 561 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding 
that the CVRA does not grant victims any rights against individuals not convicted of a crime, 
but the government can attempt to obtain voluntary restitution from such persons).  
 127. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a) (same definition of victim “representative”). 
 128. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(8) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). 
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amendment found in Senator Kyl’s home state of Arizona.129 This 
broad reading was explained by Senator Kyl, who, along with 
Senators Feinstein and Hatch, was the primary legislative sponsor of 
the CVRA: “The broad rights articulated in this section are meant to 
be rights themselves and are not intended to just be aspirational. 
One of these rights is the right to be treated with fairness. Of course, 
fairness includes the notion of due process.”130 
In light of victims’ new substantive right to fairness, Rule 2 
should be amended to make clear that all of the rules must be 
construed to be fair to victims no less than to the government and 
defendants. 
(New) Rule 10.1—Notice of Proceedings for Victims 
The Proposal: 
A new Rule 10.1 should be added to guarantee victims their 
right to notice of proceedings as follows: 
Rule 10.1 Notice to Victims. 
(a) Identification of Victim. During the prosecution of a case, the 
attorney for the government shall, at the earliest reasonable 
opportunity, identify the victims of the crime. 
 
 129. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2(A)(1) (victim’s right “to be treated with fairness, 
respect, and dignity”); see also ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (victim’s right “to be treated with 
dignity, respect, and fairness during all phases of the criminal and juvenile justice process”); 
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 (victim’s right “[t]o be treated with fairness, respect, dignity and 
privacy throughout the criminal justice process”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1 (victims “to be 
treated with fairness and respect for their dignity”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24 (victims “to be 
treated with fairness and respect for their dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice 
process”); N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 22 (victim’s right to “be treated with fairness, compassion and 
respect by the criminal justice system”); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24 (the “right to be treated 
with fairness and respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice 
process”); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10a (victims “shall be accorded fairness, dignity, and respect 
in the criminal justice process”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (“right to be treated with 
fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice 
process”); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28(1)(a) (victim’s right to be “treated with fairness, respect, 
and dignity”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (victim’s right to be treated with “fairness, dignity and 
respect for their privacy”). See generally Cassell, supra note 15, at 1387–88 (discussing victims’ 
right to fairness in Utah).  
 130. 150 CONG. REC. 4269 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).  
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(b) Notice of Case Events. During the prosecution of a crime, the 
attorney for the government shall make reasonable efforts to 
provide victims the earliest possible notice of: 
(1) The scheduling, including scheduling changes and/or 
continuances, of each court proceeding that the victim is either 
required to attend or entitled to attend; 
(2) The release or detention status of a defendant or suspected 
offender; 
(3) The filing of charges against a defendant, or the proposed 
dismissal of all charges, including the placement of the 
defendant in a pretrial diversion program and the conditions 
thereon; 
(4) The right to make a statement about pretrial release of the 
defendant; 
(5) The victim’s right to make a statement about acceptance of 
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere; 
(6) The victim’s right to attend public proceedings; 
(7) If the defendant is convicted, the date and place set for 
sentencing and the victim’s right to address the court at 
sentencing; and 
(8) After the defendant is sentenced, the sentence imposed and 
the availability of the Bureau of Prisons notification program, 
which shall provide the date, if any, on which the offender will 
be eligible for parole or supervised release. 
(c) Multiple Victims. The attorney for the government shall 
advise the court if the attorney believes that the number of victims 
makes it impracticable to provide personal notice to each victim. If 
the court finds that the number of victims makes it impracticable to 
give personal notice to each victim desiring to receive notice, the 
court shall fashion a reasonable procedure calculated to give 
reasonable notice under the circumstances. 
The Rationale: 
This proposed change stems from the CVRA’s requirement that 
victims have the “right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of 
A_CASSELL.FIN 10/24/2005 6:31 PM 
835] Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules  
 861 
 
any public court proceeding . . . involving the crime.”131 Senator 
Feinstein explained the importance of giving victims notice: 
 
Victims are the persons who are directly harmed by 
the crime and they have a stake in the criminal 
process because of that harm. Their lives are 
significantly altered by the crime and they have to live 
with the consequences for the rest of their lives. To 
deny them the opportunity to know of and be 
present at proceedings is counter to the fundamental 
principles of this country. It is simply wrong.132 
 
Under the CVRA, then, victims of the crime allegedly 
committed by the defendant133 are entitled to notice of court 
proceedings. The tricky issue is who should provide that notice to 
victims. This responsibility must fall on prosecutors and their 
investigative agents for several reasons. First, prosecutors and their 
agents are the only parties who know the identity of the victims at 
the outset of the case. After a bank robbery, for example, it is the 
FBI agents who respond and interview the tellers. Second, 
prosecutors and their agents continue dealing with victims 
throughout the course of a prosecution. They work with victims in 
investigating the crime, identifying potential defendants, preparing 
the indictment, and presenting evidence to the grand jury and at 
trial. Because of this working relationship, prosecutors are best 
situated to provide notice in most cases. Third, most crime victims 
lack legal counsel and are unfamiliar with federal criminal 
proceedings. They may need assistance from someone familiar with 
the process to understand what is happening. United States 
Attorneys’ offices, including the victim-witness components in those 
offices, are well situated to provide that assistance. As the President’s 
 131. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(2).  
 132. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein); see 
also id. at S4267 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“It does not make sense to enact victims’ rights that 
are rendered useless because the victim never knew of the proceeding at which the right had to 
be asserted.”).  
 133. See United States v. Guevara-Toloso, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9762 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005) (noting that CVRA requires notice to victims of the crime charged against the 
defendant but not notice to victims of any previous crimes the defendant may have 
committed).  
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Task Force of Victims of Crime concluded, the prosecutor is “in the 
best position to explain to victims the legal significance of various 
motions and proceedings.”134 For all these reasons, prosecutors 
should notify victims of their rights and of upcoming hearings.135 
Most states that have addressed the issue follow this approach.136 
The Justice Department appears to agree that it should notify 
victims. In the 2000 Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and 
Witness Assistance, the Department required prosecutors and their 
 134. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 64 (1982). 
 135. But cf. United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(concluding that, in the absence of a national rule requiring prosecutors to provide notice to 
victims, the court would direct the prosecutor to provide the name and contact information of 
each victim so that the court can ensure that notice is properly given). 
 136. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-23-62(8) (2000) (requiring law enforcement officers to 
give victims initial description of their rights and “[t]he name and telephone number of the 
office of the prosecuting attorney to contact for further information”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-
4409 (2001) (requiring prosecutor to provide notice to victim of criminal proceedings; CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-286e (2000) (requiring prosecutor to notify victim of any judicial 
proceedings related to the case); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9411 (2001) (requiring Attorney 
General to provide information to victim including “[n]otice of the scheduling of court 
proceedings and changes including trial date, case review and sentencing hearings”); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 17-17-8(b) (2004) (requiring prosecutor where possible to give victim “prompt 
advance notification of any scheduled court proceedings”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.500.5 
(LexisNexis 1992) (requiring prosecutor to provide victim “prompt notification, if possible, of 
judicial proceedings relating to the case”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 6101 (2003) 
(requiring prosecutor to provide victims of certain crimes notice of any plea agreement and of 
trial date); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258B, § 3 (West 2004) (requiring prosecutor to give 
victims notice of various rights); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §780.755(1) (West 1998) 
(requiring prosecutor to give victims notice of court proceedings); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
611A.03 (West 2003) (requiring prosecutor to give victim notice of plea agreement and 
sentencing hearing); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-26-9(B) (LexisNexis 2004) (requiring prosecutor 
to provide victim with notice of scheduled court proceedings); N.Y. [Executive] LAW. § 646a 
(McKinney 2005) (requiring prosecutor to provide notice of court proceedings); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-28C-1 (2004) (requiring prosecutor to notify victim of certain 
hearings); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-38-103 (2003) (requiring prosecutor to notify victim of 
“times, dates, and locations of all pertinent stages in the proceedings”); TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 56.08(b) (Vernon 2004) (requiring prosecutor to give victim notice of court 
proceedings); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-3 (2004) (requiring prosecutor to give victim notice 
of “important criminal justice hearings”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 972.14(2m) (West 1998) 
(“Before pronouncing sentence, the court shall inquire of the district attorney whether he or 
she has complied with § 971.095(2) and with sub. (3)(b), whether any of the victims of a 
crime considered at sentencing requested notice of the date, time and place of the sentencing 
hearing and, if so, whether the district attorney provided to the victim notice of the date, time 
and place of the sentencing hearing.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-204(b)(i) (2004) (requiring 
prosecutor to inform victim about all hearings). But see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.06(C) 
(2005) (requiring court to give notice to victim of court proceedings).  
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agents to provide notice to crime victims. In particular, the 
Guidelines currently obligate prosecutors to provide victims with 
“the earliest possible notice” of: 
(a) The release or detention status of an offender or suspected 
offender . . . . 
(b) The filing of charges against a suspected offender, or the 
proposed dismissal of all charges . . . . 
(c) The scheduling, including scheduling changes and/or 
continuances, of each court proceeding that the victim or witness is 
either required to attend or entitled to attend . . . . 
(d) The acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or the 
rendering of a verdict after trial . . . . 
(e) If the offender is convicted, the date set for sentencing, the 
sentence imposed . . . .137 
To avoid creating only significant new responsibilities for prosecutors 
and their agents, the proposed new Rule 10.1 is lifted essentially 
verbatim from the 2000 Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and 
Witness Assistance. The 2005 revisions to the Guidelines continue 
essentially the same requirements.138 
The drafters of the CVRA also appear to believe that the 
notification obligations will fall primarily on prosecutors’ offices, as 
the CVRA authorizes an appropriation of $22,000,000 over the next 
five fiscal years to the Office for Victims of Crime of the Department 
of Justice for enhancement of victim notification systems.139 
 137. See 2000 A.G. GUIDELINES, supra note 38; see also U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE 
FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, NEW DIRECTIONS FROM THE FIELD: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND 
SERVICES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 82 (1998) (“Prosecutors’ offices should notify victims in a 
timely manner” of all significant hearings.). 
 138. See 2005 A.G. GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 27–29 (providing for notice to 
victims, although relying on the department’s Victim Notification Systems (VNS) to do this).  
 139. See 118 Stat. 2260, 2264 (2004); see also 150 CONG. REC. S4267 (daily ed. Apr. 
22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“[W]e authorized an appropriation of funds to assure . . . 
that moneys would be made available to enhance the victim notification system, managed by 
the Department of Justice’s Office for Victims of Crime, and the resources additionally to develop 
state-of-the-art systems for notifying crime victims of important statements of development) 
(emphasis added). But cf. id. (discussing court notification of attorneys of record and 
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Presumably, those enhanced new notification systems can be used to 
keep victims apprised of court proceedings. Moreover, the CVRA 
directs that the Department of Justice and its investigative agencies 
“shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, 
and accorded, the rights described in subsection (a).”140 
Proposed new Rule 10.1 adds only two new obligations beyond 
those found in the 2000 Attorney General Guidelines: (1) notice to 
victims of their right to make a statement regarding any proposed 
plea, and (2) notice to victims of their right to attend public 
proceedings. Both of these obligations are currently found in the 
2005 Guidelines.141 
 One last issue deserves brief discussion: Is it proper for the 
Judiciary, through the rule-making process, to command another 
branch of government to take certain actions?142 The starting point 
for analyzing this question is the congressional command in the 
CVRA that the executive branch must protect victims’ rights.143 
Consequently, implementing these rights through rule changes 
presents no question of the courts inventing new rights or exercising 
some kind of “supervisory” power over federal agents.144 Instead, the 
implementation is simply enforcing congressionally created rights 
through the Judiciary’s congressionally authorized rulemaking 
authority—an uncontroversial exercise of judicial power.145 
Moreover, in the CVRA, Congress commanded the courts to 
“ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described [in the 
CVRA].”146 Rule changes needed to implement the CVRA thus rest 
concluding “it is a relatively simple matter to add another name and telephone number or 
address to that list”).  
 140. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(c)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005) (emphasis added). 
 141. See 2005 A.G. GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 27 (prosecutors to notify victims of 
all their rights under the CVRA).  
 142. Victims cannot rely on the provisions of the Attorney General Guidelines to protect 
their rights because the Guidelines themselves state that they “are not intended to . . . and may 
not be relied upon to create any rights . . . enforceable at law by any person in a matter civil or 
criminal.” 2005 A.G. GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 27.  
 143. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(c)(1). 
 144. Cf. Sarah Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: 
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
1433 (1984) (discussing more problematic applications of judicial power). 
 145.  See id. at 1476–77; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2072 (establishing court rule-making 
power). 
 146. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b) (emphasis added). 
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on this statutory authority as well. Additionally, this Article’s 
proposals affecting prosecutors are closely connected to court 
proceedings; they deal with such things as prosecutors notifying 
victims of hearings and conferring with victims in anticipation 
thereof. It is difficult to see new separation of powers concerns 
arising in such contexts so closely connected to the courtroom.  
Furthermore, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure already 
direct executive branch actions less directly connected to court 
hearings. For instance, Rule 16 directs that prosecutors must turn 
over various discoverable items to the defendant.147 Rule 41 directs 
federal agents serving a warrant to leave a copy for the person whose 
premises are searched.148 And, most controversially, Rule 5 directs 
that federal agents making an arrest “must take the defendant 
without unnecessary delay” before a judicial officer.149 The kinds of 
rule changes discussed in this Article are far less invasive than these 
commands. Finally, it should be remembered that federal 
prosecutors serve as “officers of the court.”150 In that capacity, the 
court can be reasonably expected to facilitate victims’ involvement in 
the criminal justice process.151 For all of these reasons, this proposed 
rule breaks no new ground in directing prosecutors to notify victims 
of courtroom proceedings. 
Rule 11(a)(3)—Victims’ Views on Nolo Contendere Pleas 
The Proposal: 
Rule 11’s procedures on pleas should be revised to allow victims 
to express their views on any plea of nolo contendere before the court 
decides whether to accept it as follows: 
 147. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1).  
 148. Id. at 41(f)(3). 
 149. Id. at 5(a)(1). See generally, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE ATT’Y GEN. 
ON THE JUDICIARY’S USE OF SUPERVISORY POWER TO CONTROL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
ACTION (Dec. 15, 1986), reprinted in 22 MICH. J.L. & REFORM 773 (1989).  
 150.  See United States v. Sells Eng., Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 466 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  
 151.  See, e.g., State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756 (Utah 2002), discussed infra notes 163–66 
and accompanying text. 
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(a)(3) Nolo Contendere Plea. Before accepting a plea of nolo 
contendere, the court must consider the parties’ and victims’ views 
and the public interest in the effective administration of justice. 
The Rationale: 
As discussed at greater length in the immediately following 
sections, the CVRA gives victims the right to be heard regarding any 
plea, presumably including any nolo contendere plea. It is a natural 
corollary that the court should consider the victim’s views before 
accepting any such plea. 
Rule 11(b)(4)—Victims’ Right To Be Heard on Pleas 
The Proposal: 
The court should address any victim present in court when 
taking a plea in order to determine whether the victim wishes to 
make a statement and to consider the victim’s view before accepting 
a plea as follows: 
(4) Victims’ Views. Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere or allows any plea to be withdrawn, the court must 
address any victim who is present personally in open court. During 
this address, the court must determine whether the victim wishes to 
present views regarding the proposed plea or withdrawal and, if so, 
what those views are. The court shall consider the victim’s views in 
acting on the proposed plea or withdrawal. 
The Rationale: 
The CVRA gives victims the right “to be reasonably heard at any 
public proceeding in the district court involving . . . [a] plea.”152 
Many states afford victims similar rights.153 The rationale for a 
 
 152. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005); see In re Kari Ann Jacobsen, 
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13990 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting victim’s right to be heard on pleas).  
 153. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (giving victim right to be heard and to object to 
plea agreement); MO. CONST. art. 1, § 32 (giving victim right to be heard at plea hearing); 
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28(1)(b) (giving victim the “right to be heard at important criminal 
justice hearings related to the victim”); ALA. CODE § 15-23-71 (2000) (giving victim right to 
be present at plea hearing and requiring prosecutor to confer with victim about plea); ARIZ. 
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victim’s right to be heard regarding a plea is to provide the judge 
with as much information as possible. The court is under no 
obligation to accept a plea proposed by the parties.154 After hearing 
from the victim about the plea, the court can determine what weight 
to give to the victim’s views.155 
To implement the victim’s right to be heard regarding a plea, the 
proposed rule change requires the court to directly address any 
victim present in court. This is consistent with the CVRA’s legislative 
history that explains that “[t]his provision is intended to allow crime 
victims to directly address the court in person.”156 The language of 
the proposed rule is lifted from an earlier paragraph in Rule 11, 
which requires the court to “address the defendant personally in 
open court” “before accepting a plea of guilty.”157 Victims should be 
treated even-handedly. It may be important for the judge to address 
victims directly because many victims will lack the assistance of 
counsel. As novices in legal proceedings, victims may be uncertain 
about exactly when in the process they should present their views. By 
addressing victims, the court will eliminate that uncertainty and 
ensure that the victim’s right to be heard is vindicated. 
REV. STAT. § 13-4423 (2001) (giving victim right to be present and heard at plea hearing and 
requiring prosecutor to confer with victim about plea); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.03 (West 
2003) (giving victim right to be heard at plea hearing); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-43-33 (2000) 
(giving victim right to make statement at plea hearing); N.H. REV. STAT. § 21-M:8-k (2000) 
(giving victim right to be heard at plea hearing); R.I. STAT. § 12-28-4.1 (2000) (giving victim 
right to make statement at plea hearing). See generally BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 
15, at 476–94 (discussing victims and pleas); Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea 
Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 301 (1987). 
 154. See, e.g., United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1977).  
 155. But cf. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN 
CRIMINAL TRIALS 252, 257–58 (1995) (proposing that victims have a veto over any plea); 
Bennett L. Gershman, Crimes Against Victims: The Prosecutor’s Duty of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (discussing situations in which victims have effectively 
been given a veto over pleas); Karen L. Kennard, Comment, The Victim’s Veto: A Way To 
Increase Victim Impact on Criminal Case Dispositions, 77 CAL. L. REV. 417, 437 (1989) 
(advocating that victims be given a veto over any plea). 
 156. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 157. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2). 
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Rule 11(c)(1)—Prosecution To Consider Victims’ Views on Pleas 
The Proposal: 
The prosecution should be required to consider the victims’ 
views in developing any proposed plea arrangement as follows: 
(1) In General. An attorney for the government and the 
defendant’s attorney, or the defendant when proceeding pro se, may 
discuss and reach a plea agreement. The court must not participate 
in these discussions. The attorney for the government shall make 
reasonable efforts to notify identified victims of, and consider the 
victims’ views about, any proposed plea negotiations. If the 
defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to either a charged 
offense or a lesser or related offense, the plea agreement may 
specify that an attorney for the government will . . . . 
The Rationale: 
The proposed change requires prosecutors to make reasonable 
efforts to notify victims about possible plea bargains and to consider 
the victim’s views regarding those pleas. This requirement is taken 
essentially verbatim from the Attorney General Guidelines for Victim 
and Witness Assistance, which direct prosecutors to “make reasonable 
efforts to notify identified victims of, and consider victims’ views 
about, prospective plea negotiations.”158 Twenty-nine states already 
require prosecutors to “consult with” or “obtain the views of” 
victims at the plea agreement stage.159 
The proposed rule helps to implement not only a victim’s right 
to be heard at plea proceedings but also the right to “confer with the 
attorney for the Government.”160 Given that victims have the right 
to confer, the conferring should take place at the most salient points 
in the process. As Senator Feinstein explained, “This right [to 
confer] is intended to be expansive. For example, the victim has the 
 
 158. 2005 A.G. GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 30 (defining what can be considered in 
determining whether notice is reasonable in a particular case); see also OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF 
CRIME, supra note 137, at 75 (“Prosecutors should make every effort . . . to consult with the 
victim on the terms of any negotiated plea . . . .”). 
 159. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 137, at 75.  
 160. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(5) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). 
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right to confer with the Government concerning any critical stage or 
disposition of the case.”161 Because the overwhelming majority of 
federal criminal cases are resolved by a plea, a conference between 
the victim and the prosecutor regarding the plea will be critical in 
most cases. Reflecting that fact, the rules should follow the approach 
taken by the majority of states, directing prosecutors to consult with 
victims about pleas. 
Rule 11(c)(2)—Court To Be Advised of Victim Objections to Plea 
The Proposal: 
Prosecutors (and victims’ attorneys) should be required to advise 
the court whenever they are aware that the victim objects to a 
proposed plea agreement as follows: 
(2) Disclosing a Plea Agreement. The parties must disclose the 
plea agreement in open court when the plea is offered, unless the 
court for good cause allows the parties to disclose the plea 
agreement in camera. When a plea is presented in open court, the 
attorney for the government or the attorney for any victim shall 
advise the court when the attorney is aware that the victim has any 
objection to the proposed plea agreement. 
The Rationale: 
When an attorney for the victim or for the government is aware 
that a victim objects to a plea, that information should be relayed to 
the court. In those rare cases where the victim has an attorney, the 
attorney will obviously raise the victim’s objection. The proposed 
rule change clarifies the prosecutor’s corresponding and equal 
obligation to communicate this information to the court. 
The CVRA appears to obligate prosecutors to relay a victim’s 
objection to the court, commanding them to use their “best efforts” 
to enforce victims’ rights.162 Part of those “best efforts” would seem 
to be conveying objections to the court. Victims are often untrained 
in the law and unexpectedly thrust into criminal proceedings; they 
may well believe that prosecutors automatically relay to the court 
 
 161. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
 162. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(c). 
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their objections to the plea. The proposed rule avoids such confusion 
by requiring the prosecutor to notify the court of a victim’s concern. 
The rule is limited to situations where the prosecutor is aware of an 
objection. 
This approach is consistent with the instructive case of State v. 
Casey,163 which considered whether a victim’s objection to a plea 
made to a prosecutor was sufficient to trigger the victim’s right to be 
heard under the Utah Constitution.164 In Casey, the victim told the 
prosecutor that she opposed a plea arrangement. The prosecutor 
refused to convey the victim’s concern to the court, and the trial 
judge accepted the plea. The victim then obtained legal counsel and 
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, urging that under the Utah 
Victims’ Rights Amendment, her right to be heard regarding a plea 
had been violated. The State responded that the victim was obligated 
to ask the trial court directly to be heard rather than relying on the 
prosecutor to pass that information along. In rejecting the State’s 
argument, the Utah Supreme Court explained that prosecutors, no 
less than other actors in the criminal justice system, were required to 
assist victims throughout the process.165 More important for present 
purposes, the court also concluded that prosecutors had ethical 
obligations as officers of the court to convey that information to the 
judge: 
Prosecutors must convey such requests [to be heard] because they 
are obligated to alert the court when they know that the court lacks 
relevant information. This duty, which is incumbent upon all 
attorneys, is magnified for prosecutors because, as our case law has 
repeatedly noted, prosecutors have unique responsibilities. . . . The 
prosecutor is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and 
whose interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win 
. . . but that justice shall be done.166 
Applying the reasoning of Casey to analogous rights in the 
CVRA, federal prosecutors must, as officers of the court, convey a 
 163. 44 P.3d 756 (Utah 2002). I represented the victim in this case. 
 164. See generally Nicole G. Farrell, Recent Case Development, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 716.  
 165. Casey, 44 P.3d at 763. 
 166. Id. at 764 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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victim’s request to be heard regarding a plea. Indeed, the prosecutor 
should convey not only the request to be heard but also the fact that 
the victim objects to the plea. In deciding whether to accept a plea, 
the court must consider the public interest.167 As the Tenth Circuit 
has explained, “‘Rule 11 also contemplates the rejection of a 
negotiated plea when the district court believes that bargain is too 
lenient, or otherwise not in the public interest.’”168 When the 
prosecutor is aware of an objection from a keenly interested member 
of the public—the victim—the court should not be left in the dark 
about it. 
An alternative way of drafting the rule is to require courts to 
inquire of prosecutors whether the victim has been advised of the 
proposed plea and whether the victim wishes to make a statement 
concerning it.169 For example, Oregon requires the court to ask the 
prosecutor whether the victim has been consulted about a plea and, 
if so, what the victim’s view is: 
Before the judge accepts a plea of guilty or no contest, the judge 
shall ask the district attorney if the victim requested to be notified 
and consulted regarding plea discussions. If the victim has made 
such a request, the judge shall ask the district attorney if the victim 
agrees or disagrees with the plea discussions and agreement and the 
victim’s reasons for agreement or disagreement.170 
South Dakota law contains a similar requirement that prosecutors 
disclose “any comments” by the victim about the plea.171 Texas law 
requires the court to ask the prosecutor whether a victim impact 
statement has been submitted;172 if so, the court must review that 
 167. See, e.g., United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1977).  
 168. United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1462 (10th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added) 
(quoting United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1983)).  
 169. See OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 137, at 108 (“Judges should 
facilitate the input of crime victims into plea agreements . . . and they should request that 
prosecuting attorneys demonstrate that reasonable efforts were made to confer with the 
victim.”). 
 170. OR. REV. STAT. § 135.406(1)(b) (2003). 
 171. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-7-9 (2004) (“The prosecuting attorney shall disclose 
on the record any comments on the plea agreement made by the victim, or his designee, of the 
defendant’s crime to the prosecuting attorney.”). 
 172. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(e) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (“Before 
accepting a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, the court shall inquire as to whether a 
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statement.173 Finally, before an Arizona court accepts a plea, the 
prosecutor must advise the court that reasonable efforts were made 
to confer with the victim about the plea and the victim’s view 
regarding it.174 
The rule proposed here is narrower than these state formulations: 
it requires only that a prosecutor confer with the victim about the 
plea and inform the court if the victim objects. For many significant 
categories of federal cases (e.g., typical drug trafficking offenses, 
felons in possession of a firearm, etc.), there will be no victim, much 
less a victim objection. In such cases, to require some sort of victim 
inquiry by the court or victim certification by the prosecutor would 
unnecessarily waste time. The proposed rule requires only that the 
prosecutor report a victim’s objection—in which case the court will 
presumably want to more carefully consider whether to accept a plea. 
Rule 12.1—Victim Addresses and Phone Numbers 
Not Disclosed for Alibi Purposes 
The Proposal: 
The Government currently must disclose the address and 
telephone numbers of any witnesses, including the victim, that it 
plans to use to disprove an alibi. This rule should be changed to 
protect the victim’s privacy, excluding their information from this 
requirement. 
(b) Disclosing Government Witnesses. 
(1) Disclosure. If the defendant serves a Rule 12.1(a)(2) notice 
[regarding intent to present an alibi defense], an attorney for 
the government must disclose in writing to the defendant or 
the defendant’s attorney: 
(A) the name, address, and telephone number of each 
witness and the address and telephone number of each 
witness (other than a victim) that the government intends 
  
victim impact statement has been returned to the attorney representing the state and ask for a 
copy of the statement if one has been returned.”). 
 173. See id. 
 174. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4423(b)(1) (2001). 
A_CASSELL.FIN 10/24/2005 6:31 PM 
835] Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules  
 873 
to rely on to establish the defendant’s presence at the scene 
of the alleged offense; and 
(B) each government rebuttal witness to the defendant’s 
alibi defense 
. . . . 
(c) Continuing Duty to Disclose. Both an attorney for the 
government and the defendant must promptly disclose in writing 
to the other party the name of each additional witness, and the 
address and telephone number of each additional witness (other 
than a victim) if: 
(1) the disclosing party learns of the witness before or during 
trial; and 
(2) the witness should have been disclosed under Rule 12.1(a) 
or (b) if the disclosing party had known of the witness earlier. 
In addition, a similar change should be made to Rule 12.3 regarding 
the addresses and telephone numbers of victims who will be used to 
disprove a public-authority defense. 
The Rationale: 
This proposed change implements the victim’s right to be 
“reasonably protected from the accused.”175 The victim cannot be 
reasonably protected if the defendant, without good reason, is given 
the victim’s address and telephone number. The proposed rule 
strikes the current requirement that the prosecutor must 
automatically give the defendant the victim’s address and telephone 
number even without any showing of need. Nothing in the rule, 
however, would bar the defendant from requesting that information 
by filing an appropriate motion. The court could then determine 
whether any such motion had merit.176 
 
 175. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). 
 176. Cf. United States v. Wills, 88 F.3d 704, 709–10 (9th Cir. 1996) (allowing delayed 
disclosure of alibi witness because witness feared for safety and defendant had violent history 
and allowing ex parte hearing because of need to keep identity of witness from the defendant). 
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Rule 15—Victims’ Right To Attend Pre-Trial Depositions 
The Proposal: 
Rule 15 should allow victims to attend any public deposition in a 
case as follows: 
(i) Victims Can Attend. A Victim can attend any public 
deposition taken under this rule under the same conditions as 
govern a victim’s attendance at trial. 
The Rationale: 
Victims have the right “not to be excluded from any . . . public 
court proceeding,” except in rare cases where their testimony will be 
materially affected.177 Depositions authorized by Rule 15 are for the 
purpose of preserving evidence for trial,178 and thus are effectively an 
extension of the trial. Victims accordingly have the right to attend 
such proceedings, if public, under the same conditions governing 
their attendance at trial. To avoid any confusion over this issue, the 
proposed rule change directly states that conclusion. 
Because victims can be excluded from the trial in certain rare 
situations where their testimony would be materially affected,179 they 
can likewise be excluded from a deposition in those situations. The 
proposed rule simply applies the limitations on attending trial to the 
deposition setting by providing that the “same conditions” apply to 
the victim’s attendance at the deposition. 
 
 
 177. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(3).  
 178. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 69 F.3d 419, 437 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 179. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(3), discussed infra notes 276–308 and accompanying text.  
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Rule 17—Victims’ Right to Notice of Subpoena 
of Confidential Information 
The Proposal: 
Rule 17 regarding subpoenas should be modified to give victims 
notice before personal or confidential information is subpoenaed and 
to allow victims to file a motion to quash such a subpoena as follows: 
(h)(2) Victim Information. After indictment, no record or 
document containing personal or confidential information about a 
victim may be subpoenaed without a finding by the court that the 
information is relevant to trial and that compliance appears to be 
reasonable. If the court makes such a finding, notice shall then be 
given to the victim, through the attorney for the government or for 
the victim, before the subpoena is served. On motion made 
promptly by the victim, the court may quash or modify the 
subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. 
The Rationale: 
The existing rules governing subpoenas are flawed because they 
allow the parties to subpoena personal or confidential information 
about a victim from third parties without the victim’s knowledge. 
This issue arose recently in the Utah state criminal proceedings 
involving the kidnapping of Elizabeth Smart. Elizabeth was 
kidnapped from her home in Salt Lake City, Utah. She was found 
nearly nine months later with a local transient and his wife, who had 
taken Elizabeth at knifepoint.180 Attorneys for Elizabeth’s alleged 
kidnapper subpoenaed class records from her high school—class and 
teacher lists, report cards, and disciplinary and attendance records—
and medical records from her hospital.181 While the hospital refused 
to turn over the requested records, the school willingly turned over 
the requested records without notice to the Smart family. Elizabeth’s 
father learned about the subpoena only after her school records had 
already been turned over to defense counsel. The Smart family 
 
 180. See generally ED SMART & LOIS SMART WITH LAURA MORTON, BRINGING 
ELIZABETH HOME: A JOURNEY OF FAITH AND HOPE (2003). 
 181. Stephen Hunt, Defense Blasted for Obtaining Smart’s School Records, SALT LAKE 
TRIB., Jan. 14, 2005, at B2.  
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attorney then filed a motion to return the records to the school. 
Prosecutors in the case have objected to the fact that they were not 
given an opportunity to file a motion to quash.182 The matter is still 
under review in state court. 
The problem that occurred in the Smart case under the Utah 
rules could also occur under the federal rules.183 The federal rules 
currently allow the witness to whom the subpoena is issued to 
object,184 but there is no provision for notifying the victim when 
personal or confidential information has been subpoenaed from 
another witness. 
Serving such subpoenas without notice to the victim violates the 
provisions of the CVRA guaranteeing victims the rights to be treated 
“with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy” and “with 
fairness.”185 Allowing subpoenas to go directly to third-party 
custodians of records can fail to protect privacy if the custodian is 
disinterested or disinclined to protect the victim’s privacy. Such a 
scenario is not far-fetched; a third party who is subpoenaed will often 
have no interest in incurring legal fees to protect a victim’s rights. 
Even if interested, third parties may not fully understand the 
sensitive nature of certain victim information. Victims may also have 
important statutory rights to protect. In the Elizabeth Smart case, 
for example, the school may have violated the Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act by turning over private information about 
Elizabeth.186 
Subpoenas served without notice to victims may also raise 
constitutional concerns.187 It is well settled that a right to privacy is 
implicitly incorporated within the protections guaranteed under the 
 182. Pat Reavy, Quash Smart Subpoenas, DA Says, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Feb. 1, 
2005, at B3.  
 183. See Letter from Gregory G. Skordas, attorney for Elizabeth Smart, to Judge Susan 
Bucklew (May 23, 2005) (on file with author) (proposing changes to the federal rules to avoid 
recurrence of this problem in federal court).  
 184. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). 
 185. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(8). 
 186. Pat Reavy, Elizabeth Wants Records Returned, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Jan. 15, 
2005, at B3; see 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000) (establishing rights of privacy in educational 
records).  
 187. See generally Wendy J. Murphy, Using the Federal Courts To Make State Courts 
Respect Victims’ Rights, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (discussing federal 
constitutional rights of privacy for victims’ confidential records). 
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United States Constitution. The Supreme Court “has recognized 
that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or 
zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.”188 Supreme 
Court precedent establishes two lines of privacy interests: (1) the 
“individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” and 
(2) “the interest in independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions.”189 In essence, the right to privacy includes an 
individual’s interest in making certain decisions that fundamentally 
affect his or her person “free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion.”190 In light of interests such as these, several courts have 
held that crime victims’ records—such as rape crisis counseling 
records—are not subject to subpoena.191 
The proposed new rule protects victims’ statutory and potential 
constitutional interests in two ways. First, the court is required to 
make a preliminary determination that the subpoena seeks 
information relevant at trial and that compliance appears to be 
reasonable. This is consistent with the trial court’s existing power to 
quash unreasonable subpoenas, including subpoenas directed at 
crime victims.192 Second, if the court makes a preliminary 
determination that the subpoena is appropriate, the victim would 
then receive notice of the subpoena. To avoid harassment, the notice 
would be provided either through the victim’s own attorney or, 
more commonly, through the prosecutor. 
The proposed rule makes no substantive change in the right of 
the party to obtain appropriate information through a subpoena. 
Instead, it merely changes procedures to ensure victims are treated 
fairly by having the opportunity to file a motion to quash where such 
 188. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).  
 189. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977). 
 190. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); see also Carey v. Population Servs. 
Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977). 
 191. See, e.g., State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Courts, 836 P.2d 445, 451–52 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1992) (crime victim had the right to deny defendant access to medical records); 
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 602 A.2d 1290, 1296–97 (Pa. 1992). See generally Tera Jckowski 
Peterson, Distrust and Discovery: The Impending Debacle in Discovery of Rape Victims’ 
Counseling Records in Utah, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 695; Anna Y. Joo, Note, Broadening the 
Scope of Counselor-Patient Privilege To Protect the Privacy of the Sexual Assault Survivor, 32 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 255 (1995). 
 192. See, e.g., Amsler v. United States, 391 F.2d 37, 51 (9th Cir. 1967) (upholding trial 
court’s decision to quash subpoena directed to kidnapping victim’s father for lack of 
materiality). 
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a motion is appropriate. The court is then authorized to grant the 
victim’s motion to quash under the same standards that already apply 
to other motions to quash—where compliance would be 
“unreasonable or oppressive.”193 
The proposed change does not interfere with the legitimate 
interests of the government or defendants. The change will not 
hamper government investigations because it applies only to 
subpoenas issued after indictment. Before indictment, a victim’s 
privacy is protected through grand jury secrecy. After indictment, the 
only legitimate purpose for a subpoena by either the government or 
the defendant is to obtain testimony or evidence for trial or similar 
court hearing. Rule 17 does not permit a subpoena for discovery 
purposes,194 although upon a proper showing a party can obtain pre-
trial access to materials.195 Therefore, when challenged by a victim on 
a motion to quash, the party seeking the evidence will prevail upon a 
proper showing that the subpoena is appropriate. The only change 
made by the rule, then, is to require preliminary screening by the 
court when confidential information is involved and give the victim 
the opportunity for court review in cases where legitimate interests 
are at stake. Constitutional interests in privacy and the victim’s right 
to be treated “with fairness” require nothing less. 
Rule 18—Victims’ Interests Considered in Setting Place of Prosecution 
The Proposal: 
Rule 18 should be amended to require the court to consider the 
convenience of victims in setting the place of prosecution as follows: 
Unless a statute or these rules permit otherwise, the government 
must prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was 
committed. The court must set the place of trial within the district 
with due regard for the convenience of the defendant, any victim, 
and the witnesses, and the prompt administration of justice. 
 
 193. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2). 
 194. See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 689 (1974). 
 195. See id. at 699. 
A_CASSELL.FIN 10/24/2005 6:31 PM 
835] Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules  
 879 
The Rationale: 
This change helps to implement a victim’s right under the CVRA 
to be treated “with fairness.”196 The rule change is modest. Rule 18 
already requires the court to consider the convenience of the 
“witnesses” in a case. In many cases, of course, the victim will be a 
witness. But for clarity in those cases, and to account for cases in 
which the victim will not be a witness, the rule should be amended 
to refer specifically to victims. 
Rule 20—Victims’ Views Considered Regarding Consensual Transfer 
The Proposal: 
Rule 20 should be amended to allow the court to consider the 
victims’ views in any decision to transfer a case as follows: 
(a) Consent to Transfer. A prosecution may be transferred from 
the district where the indictment or information is pending, or 
from which a warrant on a complaint has been issued, to the 
district where the defendant is arrested, held, or present if: 
(1) the defendant states in writing a wish to plead guilty or 
nolo contendere and to waive trial in the district where the 
indictment, information, or complaint is pending, consents in 
writing to the court’s disposing of the case in the transferee 
district, and files the statement in the transferee district; and 
(2) the United States attorneys in both districts approve the 
transfer in writing after consultation with any victim. If any 
victim objects to the transfer, the United States attorney in the 
transferring district or the victim’s attorney shall advise the 
court where the indictment or information is pending of the 
victim’s concerns. 
A similar change should be made to Rule 20(d) regarding 
transfer of juvenile proceedings. 
 
 196. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(8) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). 
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The Rationale: 
As with the previous proposal, this change implements the 
victim’s right under the CVRA to be “treated with fairness.”197 The 
procedure for transferring a case for a plea is not constitutionally 
required, but rather is designed for the convenience of the defendant 
and the government.198 In considering whether such administrative 
reasons justify a transfer, the concerns of the victim appropriately 
enter into the balance. For reasons similar to those discussed above 
in connection with changes regarding plea procedures, the 
prosecution would be directed to confer with the victim and to 
advise the court of any objection to the transfer.199 
Rule 21—Victims’ Views Considered Regarding Transfer for Prejudice 
The Proposal: 
Rule 21 should be amended as follows to require consideration 
of the victim’s interest in whether a case should be transferred: 
(e) Victims’ Views. The court shall not transfer any proceeding 
without giving any victim an opportunity to be heard. The court 
shall consider the views of the victim in making any transfer 
decision. 
The Rationale: 
Rule 21 authorizes the trial judge to transfer a case to avoid 
prejudice or for the convenience of the parties. The proposed rule 
would require that the court consider the victim’s concerns in 
making any such transfer decision. Such consideration would seem to 
be part and parcel of protecting the victim’s right to be “treated with 
fairness.” In addition, the vicinage provision of Article III and the 
public’s First Amendment right of access to trials give constitutional 
dimensions to the victim’s interest in transfer decisions. 
 
 197. Id. § 3771(a)(8). 
 198. See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 321, at 357–58.  
 199. See supra notes 158–174 and accompanying text.  
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Victims may have compelling interests in observing the trial in 
their local community.200 Traveling to a remote location to watch the 
trial may be financially difficult for many victims and impossible for 
indigent victims. Moreover, forcing victims to travel to distant 
communities alone may deprive them of the accompaniment and 
support of family and friends, which may be especially important 
when observing emotionally charged court proceedings. 
Defendants, too, have the right to have cases tried locally. Under 
the Sixth Amendment, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury 
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed . . . .”201 This right might be viewed as the defendant’s to 
assert or waive as circumstances dictate. For federal cases, however, 
the vicinage right is not exclusively placed in the hands of the 
defendant. Instead, Article III provides that “[t]he Trial of all 
Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such 
Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes have been 
committed.”202 
This difference in language supports the reading that the federal 
provision is a structural guarantee designed to protect broader 
interests than the defendant’s alone.203 Moreover, the provision 
provides for trial in the state where the crime was committed. In 
most cases, this state would be where the victim resided; whether the 
defendant also resided in that state would be incidental. 
An understanding of the Article III provision as protecting the 
community’s interest is bolstered by the Supreme Court’s decisions 
on right of public access to trials. In cases such as Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,204 the Court has held that a guarantee 
of the public’s right to attend trials is implicit in the First 
Amendment. Compelling victims’ interests underlie this guarantee. 
As the Court has explained, “the presence of interested spectators 
 200. See generally BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 15, 392–99 (reviewing case 
law on the victim’s interest in venue decisions). 
 201. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
 202. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
 203. See Steven A. Engel, The Public’s Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1658, 1687 (2000); see also Drew L. Kirshen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 803 
(1976). 
 204. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
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may keep [the defendant’s] triers keenly alive to a sense of their 
responsibility and to the importance of their functions.”205 In 
addition, “public proceedings vindicate the concerns of the victims 
and the community in knowing that offenders are being brought to 
account for their criminal conduct.”206 As Justice Blackmun has 
emphasized, “The victim of the crime, the family of the victim, [and] 
others who have suffered similarly . . . have an interest in observing 
the course of a prosecution.”207 Victims are vitally interested in 
observing criminal trials because society has withdrawn “both from 
the victim and the vigilante the enforcement of criminal laws, but [it] 
cannot erase from people’s consciousness the fundamental, natural 
yearning to see justice done—or even the urge for retribution.”208 To 
be sure, transferring a trial to a distant city may not flatly violate the 
public right of access to a trial, but it can surely burden the rights of 
the public, including the victim, which suggests that victims ought 
to be heard before any such decision is made. 
The Article III vicinage provision and the public right of access 
to trials provide constitutional underpinnings for construing the 
victim’s rights under the CVRA to include a right to be heard on 
transfer proceedings. In addition, Congress has mandated that 
victims be treated with fairness. This is a broad provision intended to 
be broadly construed and to give victims a right to due process. As 
Senator Kyl has stated, 
The broad rights articulated in this section are meant to be rights 
themselves and are not intended to just be aspirational. One of 
these rights is the right to be treated with fairness. Of course, 
fairness includes the notion of due process. Too often victims of crime 
experience a secondary victimization at the hands of the criminal 
justice system. This provision is intended to direct Government 
agencies and employees, whether they are in executive or judicial 
branches, to treat victims of crime with the respect they deserve 
and to afford them due process.209 
 205. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979) (internal citation omitted). 
 206. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984).  
 207. Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 428 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 208. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571. 
 209. 150 CONG. REC. S10,910–11 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) 
(emphases added).  
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Clearly, Congress intended to afford crime victims a broad right 
to due process in criminal proceedings. Due process, of course, 
uncontroversially includes a right to be heard.210 Thus, victims 
should be heard before the court makes a transfer decision. 
Concluding that victims have a right to be heard on transfer 
decision does not mean, of course, that they will dictate the transfer 
decision. In some cases, the defendant will be able to establish 
sufficiently pervasive prejudice in a particular community to entitle 
him to a change of venue to protect his constitutional rights.211 But 
the limited point here is that victims may provide an important 
perspective that the judge ought to consider in reaching a decision. 
Moreover, even if the judge decides to transfer a case, the victims 
may have valuable information for the judge on where to transfer the 
case to (e.g., to an adjacent state rather than a distant one). 
An illustration of the general approach of the proposed rule 
comes from State v. Timmendequas,212 a capital case decided by the 
New Jersey Supreme Court. In Timmendequas, the trial judge 
imported a jury from a distant community rather than force the 
family of a murdered young girl to travel to another district. 
Construing New Jersey state law provisions similar to the CVRA’s, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that the trial judge 
properly considered the views of the victim’s family: 
Over the past decade, both nationwide and in New Jersey, a 
significant amount of legislation has been passed implementing 
increased levels of protection for victims of crime. Specifically, in 
New Jersey, the Legislature enacted the “Crime Victim’s Bill of 
Rights.” That amendment marked the culmination of the 
Legislature’s efforts to increase the participation of crime victims in 
the criminal justice system.  
 210. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) 
(acknowledging that “[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to 
be heard” (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914))).  
 211. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (holding that prisoner should have 
been granted change of venue where pre-trial publicity caused prejudice). But cf. FLETCHER, 
supra note 155, at 252 (calling for abolition of a defendant’s right to change venue because it 
“is, in effect, to accord the defense a whole peremptory challenge against the entire 
community”). 
 212. 737 A.2d 55 (N.J. 1999). 
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 The purpose of the Victim’s Rights Amendment was to 
“enhance and protect the necessary role of crime victims and 
witnesses in the criminal justice process. In furtherance of [that 
goal], the improved treatment of these persons should be assured 
through the establishment of specific rights.” One of the 
enumerated rights guaranteed for victims is “[t]o have 
inconveniences associated with participation in the criminal justice 
process minimized to the fullest extent possible.” 
 . . . . 
 . . . The [trial] court explicitly stated that it was not favoring the 
rights of the victims over those of defendant. Rather, it was simply 
taking their concerns into consideration, as it had not done 
previously. Taking the concerns of the victim’s family into account 
does not constitute error, provided that the constitutional rights of 
the defendant are not denied or infringed on by that decision.213 
Just as the New Jersey courts have recognized that victims’ 
interests should be considered in transfer decisions, the federal courts 
should do the same. Therefore, Rule 21 should be amended to allow 
victims to provide information to the judge on transfer decisions. 
Rule 23—Victims’ Views Considered Regarding Non-Jury Trial 
The Proposal: 
The court should be required to consider the views of victims 
before allowing waiver of a jury trial as follows: 
  
Rule 23. Jury or Nonjury Trial 
(a) Jury Trial. If the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the trial 
must be by jury unless: 
(1) the defendant waives a jury trial in writing; 
(2) the government consents; and 
(3) the court approves after considering the views of any 
victims. 
 
 213. Id. at 76 (internal citations omitted). The hardship to the victim was established via 
affidavits from the victim’s family provided to the court by the prosecutor.  
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The Rationale: 
In the federal courts the “preferred” trial method is a jury trial.214 
As Justice Blackmun has explained, the public has interests, 
independent of a criminal defendant, in monitoring judges, police, 
and prosecutors—and in being educated about “the manner in 
which criminal justice is administered.”215 Nonetheless, the Supreme 
Court has concluded that defendants can waive their right to a jury 
trial.216 To help protect the general public interest in trial by jury, 
Rule 23 requires not only prosecutor approval217 but also judicial 
approval before proceeding by way of bench trial. This approval 
requires careful weighing of the competing concerns. The Supreme 
Court has instructed that  
 
the duty of the trial court [in considering whether to approve a jury 
trial waiver] is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but 
with sound and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid 
unreasonable or undue departures from that mode of trial or from 
any of the essential elements thereof, and with a caution increasing 
in degree as the offenses dealt with increase in gravity.218  
 
This is a “serious and weighty responsibility.”219 
 214. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965) (“Trial by jury has been 
established by the Constitution as the ‘normal and preferable mode of disposing of issues of 
fact in criminal cases.’” (citation omitted)). See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the 
Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. 
L. REV. 33, 68 (2003). 
 215. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 428 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting in 
part). 
 216. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). But cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill 
of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1196–98 (1991) (mounting a strong 
argument against Patton and noting that before 1930 court decisions had held jury trial could 
not be waived). 
 217. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a)(2). But cf. Adam H. Kurland, Providing a Criminal 
Defendant with a Unilateral Right to a Bench Trial: A Renewed Call To Amend Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 23(a), 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309 (1993) (suggesting that prosecutorial 
consent should be eliminated by the legislature). See generally ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE § 15-1.2, cmt. at 15.17 (2d ed. 1980) (concluding that arguments in favor of 
requiring prosecutorial approval of jury trial waivers outweigh those against).  
 218. Patton, 281 U.S. at 312–13.  
 219. United States v. Saadya, 750 F.2d 1419, 1421 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
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To discharge that serious and weighty responsibility, the trial 
court should receive as much information as possible. The victim is 
often well situated to provide information about how the public will 
view a non-jury trial. The proposed rule change takes the modest 
step of requiring the court to hear the victim before approving any 
non-jury trial, a step that is consistent with the CVRA’s command 
that victims be treated with fairness. 
Importantly, this change would not interfere with defendants’ 
rights. The Supreme Court has squarely held that the defendant lacks 
any constitutional right to unilaterally elect a bench trial.220 Of 
course, in some circumstances, despite a victim’s objection, a non-
jury trial nonetheless will be appropriate. Moreover, in extreme cases, 
the defendant may have a right to a non-jury trial where pretrial 
publicity has pervasively tainted the jury pool.221 Nothing in the 
proposed rule change would interfere with a court’s right to approve 
a bench trial in such circumstances, so long as the court considers 
the victim’s perspective as part of the approval process. 
Rule 32(a)—Deleting Old Definition of “Victim” 
The Proposal: 
The definition of “victim” currently contained in Rule 32 should 
be stricken as follows: 
Rule 32. Sentencing and Judgment 
(a) Definitions. The following definitions apply under this rule: 
(1) “Crime of violence or sexual abuse” means: 
(A) a crime that involves the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against another’s person or 
property; or 
(B) a crime under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2248 or §§ 2251–
2257. 
 
 220. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965) (finding that waiver of jury trial 
may be conditioned on consent of prosecutor); cf. Kurland, supra note 217, at 340–46 (urging 
that the rules be amended to create such a right, but not considering in any way the victim’s 
interests involved). 
 221. See Singer, 380 U.S. at 37–38 (leaving this question open). 
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(2) “Victim” means an individual against whom the defendant 
committed an offense for which the court will impose sentence. 
The Rationale: 
The old definition of victim in Rule 32 is now too narrow, as it is 
limited to crimes of violence or sexual abuse. The CVRA, in contrast, 
includes all victims within its protections. In the proposed new rules, 
“victim” would be defined in Rule 1.222 Accordingly, the narrower 
definition found here can simply be eliminated. The Advisory 
Committee on Criminal Rules is well aware of this issue, having 
withdrawn a previous proposal to expand Rule 32 to include all 
victims in the wake of the CVRA.223 
Rule 32(c)(1)(B)—Presentence Report Considering  
Restitution in All Cases 
The Proposal: 
Rule 32(c)(1)(B) should be amended to require that the 
presentence report contain restitution information in all cases as 
follows: 
(c) Presentence Investigation. 
(1) Required Investigation. 
(A) In General. The probation officer must conduct a 
presentence investigation and submit a report to the court 
before it imposes sentence unless: 
(i) 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) or another statute requires 
otherwise; or 
(ii) the court finds that the information in the record 
enables it to meaningfully exercise its sentencing 
authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and the court 
explains its finding on the record. 
 
 222. See supra notes 120–27 and accompanying text. 
 223. See Letter from Ed Carnes, Chair of the Advisory Comm. on Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair of the Standing Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (May 18, 2004) (on file with the author) (noting that proposed 
expansion of Rule 32 should be withdrawn if the CVRA was passed). 
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(B) Restitution. If the law requires permits restitution, the 
probation officer must conduct an investigation and 
submit a report that contains sufficient information for the 
court to order restitution. 
The Rationale: 
As currently written, the rule directs that a presentence report 
contain information about restitution only when the law “requires” 
restitution. The proposed amendment directs that all presentence 
reports contain appropriate restitution information whenever the law 
“permits” restitution. If the law permits restitution, the court ought 
to receive information sufficient to allow it to determine whether to 
order such restitution. Only with such knowledge can the court 
appropriately exercise its discretion. 
In most cases, restitution is covered by one of two federal 
statutes: the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA),224 
and its predecessor, the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 
(VWPA).225 For all crimes of violence and certain crimes against 
property, the MVRA firmly directs that “[n]otwithstanding any 
other provision of law, when sentencing a defendant convicted of 
[certain offenses such as crimes of violence] . . . the court shall order 
. . . that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense 
or, if the victim is deceased, to the victim’s estate.”226 For other 
crimes, the earlier VWPA controls. It permits the court to order 
restitution in its discretion after considering various relevant 
factors.227 
In its current form, Rule 32(c)(1)(B) suggests that the probation 
officer is required to include restitution information only in a case 
covered by the MVRA because only then is restitution (in the 
language of the current rule) “required.”228 No sound reason exists 
 
 224. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A, 3664 (2000).  
 225. Id. §§ 3663, 3664. See generally United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285 
(D. Utah 2004) (discussing different statutes), rev’d on other grounds, United States v. 
Serawop, 410 F.3d 656 (10th Cir. 2005).  
 226. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) (emphasis added); see United States v. Monts, 311 F.3d 
993, 1001 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that restitution under the MVRA is mandatory).  
 227. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(3); see United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 801 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (holding that restitution under the VWPA is discretionary).  
 228. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1)(B). 
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for such a limitation, particularly after the enactment of the CVRA. 
The CVRA guarantees that victims have “the right to full and timely 
restitution as provided in law.”229 Even when the court is proceeding 
under the discretionary VWPA, without appropriate information in 
the presentence report, the court cannot determine whether to 
exercise its discretion to award restitution. Therefore, the rule should 
be changed to require that the presentence report contain restitution 
information, from which the court can determine whether to make a 
restitution award. 
(New) Rule 32(c)(3)—Probation Officer To Seek 
Out Victim Information 
The Proposal: 
The probation officer preparing a presentence report should be 
directed to determine whether a victim wishes to provide 
information for the report as follows: 
(3) Victim Information. The probation officer must determine 
whether any victim wishes to provide information for the 
presentence report. 
The Rationale: 
Under the CVRA, the victim has “[t]he right to be reasonably 
heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving . . . 
sentencing . . . .”230 This right clearly encompasses the victim’s right 
to allocate, or make an oral statement at sentencing, as discussed 
below in connection with Rule 32(i).231 However, the right to be 
“reasonably heard” also appears to include the opportunity to 
provide information to the probation office during preparation of the 
presentence report. 
As Senator Kyl explained, the victim’s right to be heard at 
sentencing should be broadly construed: 
 
 229. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(6) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). 
 230. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4). 
 231. See infra notes 273–75 and accompanying text. 
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[The CVRA] provides victims the right to reasonably be heard at 
any public proceeding involving . . . sentencing. This provision is 
intended to allow crime victims to directly address the court in 
person. It is not necessary for the victim to obtain the permission of 
either party to do so . . . . When a victim invokes this right during 
. . . sentencing proceedings, it is intended that . . . he or she be 
allowed to provide all three types of victim impact: the character of 
the victim, the impact of the crime on the victim, the victims’ 
family and the community, and sentencing recommendations . . . . 
 It is not the intent of the term “reasonably” in the phrase “to be 
reasonably heard” to provide any excuse for denying a victim the 
right to appear in person and directly address the court. Indeed, 
the very purpose of this section is to allow the victim to appear 
personally and directly address the court. This section would fail in 
its intent if courts determined that written, rather than oral 
communication, could generally satisfy this right. On the other 
hand, the term “reasonably” is meant to allow for alternative 
methods of communicating a victim’s views to the court when the 
victim is unable to attend the proceedings. Such circumstances 
might arise, for example, if the victim is incarcerated on unrelated 
matters at the time of the proceedings or if a victim cannot afford 
to travel to a courthouse. In such cases, communication by the 
victim to the court is permitted by other reasonable means.232 
In light of this legislative history, victims undoubtedly have a 
right to make an in-court statement at sentencing as part of their 
right “to be heard.” But they also have the right to communicate in 
other ways with the court. At sentencing, an obvious alternative way 
is via the probation officer. If there is any doubt about whether the 
right “to be heard” covers communications to the probation officer, 
the right “to be treated with fairness” comfortably covers such a 
requirement. 
The proposed rule requires that the probation office affirmatively 
seek out the victim. It is unlikely that a probation officer could 
properly prepare a thorough presentence report without obtaining 
the victim’s views. Indeed, the rules already require the officer to 
include victim information in the report.233 Because there is no way 
 232. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) 
(emphases added); see also id. (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
 233. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 32(d)(2)(B)). 
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to know in advance whether the victim will have relevant information 
for the report, the probation officer should be required to investigate 
that possibility. Of course, nothing in the proposed rule change 
would require the probation officer to include irrelevant or 
argumentative information in the report. 
Rule 32(d)(2)(B)—Presentence Report To Contain  
Victim Information 
The Proposal: 
Rule 32(d)(2)(B) should be amended to refer directly to victims 
in describing the content of the presentence report and to conform 
to the style used for information about defendants as follows: 
(2) Additional Information. The presentence report must also 
contain the following information: 
(A) the defendant’s history and characteristics, including: 
(i) any prior criminal record; 
(ii) the defendant’s financial condition; and 
(iii) any circumstances affecting the defendant’s behavior 
that may be helpful in imposing sentence or in correctional 
treatment; 
(B) verified information, stated in a nonargumentative style, 
that assesses the financial, social, psychological, and medical 
impact on any individual against whom the offense has been 
committed any victim of the crime . . . 
The Rationale: 
As discussed at the outset of this article,234 Rule 32(d)(2)(B) 
typifies the victim’s absence from the current federal rules by failing 
to use the word “victim” in describing what information belongs in a 
presentence report. In addition, the rule should be amended to 
conform to the style used in describing the presentence report’s 
information about the defendant. The rule dealing with the 
 
 234. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text. 
A_CASSELL.FIN 10/24/2005 6:31 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
892 
defendant’s background235 contains no requirement that information 
be “verified” or stated in a “non-argumentative style.” As a matter of 
even-handedness, no such requirement should be listed for victim 
information. Of course, well-trained federal probation officers will no 
doubt attempt to verify all information in the presentence report and 
phrase all of the report in a non-argumentative style. The peculiarity 
in the current rule is that, among the numerous subjects covered by 
the rules, the verification and non-argumentative style requirements 
apply to victim information alone. 
Rule 32(e)—Prosecutor To Disclose Presentence Report to Victim 
The Proposal: 
The prosecutor should be required to disclose relevant parts of 
the presentence report to victims as follows: 
(e) Disclosing the Report and Recommendation. 
(1) Time to Disclose. Unless the defendant has consented in 
writing, the probation officer must not submit a presentence 
report to the court or disclose its contents to anyone until the 
defendant has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, or has been 
found guilty. 
(2) Minimum Required Notice. The probation officer must 
give the presentence report to the defendant, the defendant’s 
attorney, and an attorney for the government at least 35 days 
before sentencing unless the defendant waives this minimum 
period. The attorney for the government shall, if any victim 
requests, communicate the relevant contents of the presentence 
report to the victim. 
The Rationale: 
The presentence report plays a critical role in the federal 
sentencing process. The report contains information about the 
crime, the background of the defendant, the impact of the crime on 
the victim, and other matters relevant to sentencing. Most 
important, the report also contains a calculation under the Federal 
 
 235. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(A). 
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Sentencing Guidelines specifying a range for any recommended 
prison sentence (e.g., forty-six to fifty-seven months). While judges 
need not slavishly impose a sentence within this range,236 most trial 
judges give significant weight to the Guidelines calculation,237 and 
appellate courts have discouraged straying too far from the 
Guidelines without good reason.238 
The CVRA entitles victims to be heard on disputed Guidelines 
issues and, as a corollary, entitles them to the right to review parts of 
the presentence report relevant to those issues. The CVRA gives 
victims “[t]he right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding 
in the district court involving . . . sentencing . . . .”239 This codifies 
the right of crime victims to provide what is known as a “victim 
impact statement” to the court.240 The victim’s right to be heard, 
however, is not narrowly circumscribed to just impact information. 
To the contrary, the right conferred is a broad one—to be 
“reasonably heard” at the sentencing proceeding. 
The victim’s right to be “reasonably heard” is best understood as 
giving the victim the opportunity to speak about disputed issues 
regarding the Sentencing Guidelines calculation. As Senator Kyl 
explained, the right to be heard includes the right to make 
sentencing recommendations: 
When a victim invokes this right [to be heard] during . . . 
sentencing proceedings, it is intended that the [sic] he or she be 
allowed to provide all three types of victim impact [information]: 
the character of the victim, the impact of the crime on the victim, 
 236. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
 237. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912 (D. Utah 2005) (giving 
“heavy weight” to Guidelines recommendation). 
 238. See, e.g., United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Rogers, 400 F.3d 640 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 239. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). 
 240. See generally BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 15, at 625–67 (discussing 
victim impact statements); Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and the 
Effects of Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373, 1395–96; cf. Dan 
Narled, State, Be Not Proud: A Retroactive Defense of the Commutation of Death Row and the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (2005). 
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the victim’s family and the community, and sentencing 
recommendations.241 
A “sentencing recommendation” will often directly implicate 
Guidelines issues. For example, if the victim wishes to recommend a 
hundred-month sentence when the maximum guideline range is only 
fifty-seven months, that sentencing recommendation is essentially 
meaningless unless a victim can provide a basis for recalculating the 
Guidelines or departing or varying from them.242 
Because a victim has the right to be heard on a Guidelines issue, 
a victim also has the right to see the document which contains the 
Guidelines calculations—the presentence report.243 Congress 
intended the victim’s right to be heard to be construed broadly, as 
Senator Feinstein stated: “The victim of crime, or their counsel, 
should be able to provide any information, as well as their opinion, 
directly to the court concerning the . . . sentencing of the 
accused.”244 It is hard to see how victims can meaningfully provide 
“any information” that would have a bearing on the sentence 
without being informed of the Guidelines calculations that likely will 
drive the sentence and reviewing the document that underlies those 
calculations. 
An independent basis for victims reviewing presentence reports is 
within the victim’s broad right under the CVRA to be “treated with 
fairness.”245 This right easily encompasses a right of access to relevant 
parts of the presentence report. The victim’s right to fairness gives 
victims a free-standing right to due process. As Senator Kyl 
instructed, “Of course, fairness includes the notion of due process . . . . 
 241. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis 
added). See generally BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 15, at ch. 10 (discussing three 
types of victim impact information). 
 242. See United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1272–73 (D. Utah 2005) 
(discussing departures and variances from the Guidelines).  
 243. Magistrate Judge Orenstein of the Eastern District of New York, who has written 
many thoughtful opinions on the CVRA, has taken a contrary position. See Report and 
Recommendation, United States v. Ingrassis, No. CR 04-0455 at 31 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2005) 
(“[I]n the absence of any change to applicable rules or the Guidelines, the court is under no 
legal obligation to ensure such disclosure” of the presentence report.). For the reasons 
explained here, I think he takes too narrow a view of the victim’s rights at sentencing.  
 244. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) 
(emphasis added). 
 245. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(8) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). 
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This provision is intended to direct government agencies and 
employees, whether they are in the executive or judicial branches, to 
treat victims of crime with the respect they deserve and to afford 
them due process.”246 Due process principles dictate that victims have 
the right to be apprised of Guidelines calculations and related issues. 
The Supreme Court has explained that “[i]t is . . . fundamental that 
the right to . . . an opportunity to be heard ‘must be granted at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”247 It is not 
“meaningful” for victims to make sentencing recommendations 
without the benefit of knowing what everyone else in that 
courtroom knows: the recommended Guidelines range and how that 
range was derived. Congress plainly intended to pass a law 
establishing “[f]air play for crime victims, meaningful participation 
of crime victims in the justice system, [and] protection against a 
government that would take from a crime victim the dignity of due 
process.”248 In federal sentencing today, meaningful participation 
means participation regarding Guidelines issues. 
It is interesting that the federal law allowing appointment of a 
guardian ad litem for juvenile victims appears to allow for access to 
the presentence report. The law guarantees that, upon appointment, 
a guardian ad litem “may have access to all reports, evaluations and 
records, except attorney’s work product, necessary to effectively 
advocate for the child.”249 In a recent federal “shaken baby” case in 
Arizona, a guardian for the child victim received access to the 
presentence report under this provision.250 The guardian in that case 
found it exceedingly difficult to formulate an appropriate sentencing 
recommendation without access to the presentence report. After 
successfully gaining access to the report, she found a need to change 
her original recommendation. She later reported that “[b]ut for the 
 246. 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) 
(emphases added).  
 247. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 
545, 552 (1965)). 
 248. 150 CONG. REC. S4264 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis 
added). 
 249. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(h)(2) (2000).  
 250. See United States v. James, No. CR-04-0651-PCT-JAT (D. Ariz. 2005).  
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disclosure, I would have ended up making a mis-informed 
recommendation.”251  
A victim’s right to review the presentence report is also 
important to ensure proper restitution. Federal law guarantees most 
victims of serious crimes the right to restitution.252 Reinforcing those 
laws, the CVRA guarantees that victims have “[t]he right to full and 
timely restitution as provided in law.”253 As a practical matter, many 
of the calculations supporting a restitution award will rest on 
information in the presentence report. While the restitution statutes 
have their own detailed procedural provisions,254 the presentence 
report is clearly a central part of the restitution process. If a 
presentence report fails to accurately recount restitution figures, 
crime victims may be short-changed. For all these reasons, the 
CVRA should be understood as giving victims the right to review 
relevant parts of the presentence report and to be heard before a 
court makes any final conclusions about Guidelines calculations and 
other sentencing issues. Many states follow a similar approach and 
give victims access to the presentence report.255 
In February 2005, I testified before the Sentencing Commission 
to recommend a change in the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
Guidelines Manual along the lines of the proposals contained in this 
 251. E-mail from Keli Luther, Arizona Voice for Victims, to Paul G. Cassell (June 20, 
2005) (on file with author).  
 252. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (Mandatory Victims Restitution Act); see also id. § 3663 
(Victim Witness Protection Act). 
 253. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(6) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). 
 254. 18 U.S.C. § 3664.  
 255. ALA. CODE § 15-23-73 (1975) (“victim shall have the right to review a copy of the 
pre-sentence investigative report, subject to the applicable federal or state confidentiality 
laws”); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.023 (2004) (giving victim right to look at portions of 
sentencing report); ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 2.1 (giving victim right to review presentence 
report when available to the defendant); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4425 (2004) (giving 
victim right to review presentence report “except those parts excised by the court or made 
confidential by law”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.001 (2000) (giving victim right to review 
presentence report); IDAHO CODE § 19-5306 (2004) (giving victim right to review 
presentence report); IND. STAT. ANN. 35-40-5-6(b) (2004) (giving victim right to read and 
“respond to” material contained in the presentence report); LA. CONST. art. 1, § 25 (giving 
victim “right to review and comment upon the presentence report”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 
46-18-113 (2005) (giving prosecutor discretion to disclose contents of presentence report to 
victim); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.077 (2003) (presentence report may be made available to 
victim); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-304(5) (2005) (giving prosecutor discretion to 
allow victim or victim’s family to see presentence report). 
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Article.256 In particular, I suggested that the Commission change its 
current rule, which allows only the parties to see the presentence 
report.257 The Practitioners’ Advisory Group to the Sentencing 
Commission later disputed my proposal. In a letter to the 
Commission,258 they argued that “[n]othing in the CVRA or its 
legislative history states that crime victims should be permitted to 
review portions of the presentence report, dispute guidelines 
calculations, raise grounds for departure, or, as such rights would 
seem to imply, appeal a sentence on factual or legal grounds.”259 The 
Practitioners’ Group also cited the drafting history of the proposed 
constitutional amendment protecting victims’ rights, which they 
thought was limited to giving a victim merely the right to “allocute” 
at sentencing—that is, merely to provide victim impact 
information.260 
The Practitioners’ Group’s arguments are flawed for several 
reasons. First, the Group too narrowly views the relevant legislative 
history of the CVRA. As explained above, Congress intended for 
victims to have broad rights in the sentencing process, including 
rights to be reasonably heard in a meaningful manner.261 It is not 
reasonable to deprive victims of the critical information in the 
presentence report. Second, the Practioners’ Group inaccurately 
describes the relevant history of the Victims’ Rights Amendment. It 
is true that the proposed constitutional amendment contained a right 
to be “reasonably heard,” just as the CVRA does. However, the 
Practitioner’s Group fails to recognize that the legislative history of 
the amendment suggests that Congress was taking an expansive view 
of the victim’s right to be heard at sentencing, including a view that 
 256. See The Effect of United States v. Booker on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 
Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (Feb. 15, 2005) (statement of Paul G. Cassell, 
United States Judge for the District of Utah), available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/ 
02_15_05/cassell_testimony.pdf. 
 257. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1 Federal Sentencing Guidelines § 6A1.2 (West 
2004). 
 258. Letter from Amy Baron-Evans & Mark Flanagan to Hon. Ricardo H. Hinojosa 
(Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/ 
files/pag_letter.doc. 
 259. Id. at 2. 
 260. Id.  
 261. See supra notes 239–44 and accompanying text.  
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would embrace a victim’s right to make a specific sentencing 
recommendation.262 
Most important, the Practitioners’ Group’s letter fails to consider 
the impact of denying the victim access to the presentence report on 
the victim’s right to fairness. Presumably the Group, comprised 
primarily of defense attorneys, would be outraged if defendants were 
sentenced without receiving notice about relevant parts of the 
presentence report, because of the defendant’s due process rights. 
But victims now also have due process rights during sentencing, 
which make it clear that they should receive the same information. 
The Practitioners’ Group raises one concern that can be readily 
dispelled. The Group wonders whether a victim’s right to be heard 
on Guidelines issues implies a general right to appeal a sentence. It 
would not. The CVRA contains its own specific remedial provision, 
which permits victims to appeal only denials of their rights.263 It 
specifically allows a victim to file a motion “to re-open . . . a 
sentence” only for violations of the victim’s “right to be heard.”264 
Moreover, while victims possess due process protections, due process 
does not guarantee a right to an appeal.265 Finally, the Sentencing 
Reform Act spells out the limited rights of appeal on Guidelines 
issues available to only the government and the defense.266 For all 
these reasons, victims have the right to review relevant parts of the 
 262. The Group cites a 2000 Senate Judiciary Committee Report regarding the Victims’ 
Rights Amendment, which referenced a Tenth Circuit decision restricting the right of victims 
to present a sentencing recommendation. See Letter from Amy Baron-Evans, supra note 258 
(citing S. REP. NO. 106-254, at 12 (2000) (discussing Robinson v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216 
(10th Cir. 1991))). By 2003, however, the same passage in the Senate Judiciary Committee 
Report was changed to remove the citation to that case and instead to cite a leading proponent 
of expansive rights for victims to give judges specific sentencing recommendations: 
  Victim impact statements concerning the character of the victim and the 
impact of the crime remain constitutional. See Douglas E. Beloof, Constitutional 
Implications of Crime Victims as Participants, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 282 (2003). 
The Committee does not intend to alter or comment on laws existing in some States 
allowing for victim opinion as to the proper sentence.  
S. REP. NO. 108-191, at 38 (2003). It is hard to see anything in this history suggesting that 
Congress wanted victims to be deprived of the chance to review presentence reports. 
 263. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(5) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). See generally In re W.R. 
Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 561–64 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing appeals under 
CVRA).  
 264. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(5). 
 265. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894). 
 266. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2000). 
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presentence report and to be heard on Guidelines issues in the trial 
court, but if the court properly hears them on the Guidelines issues, 
victims would not have the right to appeal the sentence the court 
ultimately imposes.  
Because victims have a right of access to the presentence report, 
the question arises of how to provide that access. Nothing in current 
law precludes releasing presentence reports to victims. While 18 
U.S.C. § 3552 requires disclosure to government and defense 
counsel, it does not forbid further dissemination. Several federal 
courts have held that circulation of reports to third parties is proper 
on a showing of particularized need approved by the court.267 Some 
courts’ local rules also allow additional distribution with court 
approval.268 Victims always have a particularized need for access to 
the Guidelines calculations and related parts of the presentence 
report; without such access they are unable to effectively make their 
sentencing recommendation. 
In view of that legal landscape, there are three ways in which the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure might deal with disclosure of 
the presentence reports to victims: 
 
(1) Complete Disclosure. The rules could direct full disclosure of 
the presentence report to the victim. While no statute bars this 
approach, legitimate policy objections might be raised. Some reports 
may contain sensitive private information about the defendant such 
as results of psychiatric examinations, prior history of drug use, or 
childhood sexual abuse. Some reports may also reveal confidential 
law enforcement information that should not be widely circulated. 
Victims may not always need access to these parts of the report. 
While a number of states give victims unfettered right to access the 
presentence report,269 a more limited approach seems appropriate in 
the federal system. 
 
 267. See, e.g., United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 238 (7th Cir. 1989) (compelling, 
particularized need standard); United States v. Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574, 1579 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(interests of justice standard); United States v. Charmer Indus., Inc., 711 F.2d 1164, 1174 (2d 
Cir. 1983) (compelling need standard). 
 268. See, e.g., D. UTAH CRIM. LOCAL R. 32-1(c) (presentence reports not released 
without order of the court).  
 269. See supra note 255.  
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(2) Selective Disclosure. The rules could direct that the probation 
office redact any presentence report to remove confidential 
information and then provide the redacted report to the victim. This 
approach, too, is problematic; it would require considerable work by 
busy probation officers to prepare an additional document—a 
redacted report—presumably only after consulting with the attorneys 
on both sides of the case about what might be viewed as 
confidential. 
 
(3) Disclosure through Prosecutors. The simplest solution to the 
competing concerns is to disclose the report to victims through an 
intermediary: the prosecutor. The prosecutor would serve as the 
filter for confidential information and assist the victim by 
highlighting critical parts of the report. Opponents might object that 
this approach would burden prosecutors, who are no less busy than 
probation officers. But the CVRA already gives victims the right to 
“confer” with prosecutors,270 and presumably they will confer 
regarding the important topic of sentencing. Moreover, many U.S. 
Attorney’s Offices already have Victim-Witness Coordinators who 
communicate with victims regarding impact statements. The CVRA 
also authorizes increased funding of $22 million for the Victim-
Witness Assistance Programs in U.S. Attorney’s Offices, presumably 
enabling those offices to expand their victim services.271 
 
It might be burdensome to require that prosecutors disclose 
presentence reports to victims in all cases, even when they are not 
interested in such disclosure. Accordingly, disclosure of the report 
should be required only upon request of a victim. 
For all those reasons, the Commission should amend the rules to 
give requesting victims access to presentence reports through the 
prosecutor. In addition, some of the aspects of preparing and 
disclosing presentence reports are covered in Chapter 6.A of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual.272 The Manual falls 
within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. 
Accordingly, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules should 
 270. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(5) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). 
 271. See 118 Stat. 2260, 2264 (2004). 
  272. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.  
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coordinate with the Commission to ensure that any changes in the 
Criminal Rules are consistent with the provisions of the Manual. 
Rule 32(f), (h), (i)—Victim Opportunity To Object 
to Presentence Report 
The Proposal: 
Rule 32(f), (h), and (i) should be amended to allow the victim to 
object to the presentence report as follows: 
(f) Objecting to the Report. 
(1) Time To Object. Within 14 days after receiving the 
presentence report, the parties must state in writing any 
objections, including objections to material information, 
sentencing guideline ranges, and policy statements contained in 
or omitted from the report. The attorney for the government 
or for the victim shall raise for the victim any reasonable 
objection by the victim to the presentence report. 
(2) Serving Objections. An objecting party must provide a 
copy of its objections to the opposing party and to the 
probation officer. 
(3) Action on Objections. After receiving objections, the 
probation officer may meet with the parties and the victim to 
discuss the objections. The probation officer may then 
investigate further and revise the presentence report as 
appropriate. 
. . . . 
(h) Notice of Possible Departure from Sentencing Guidelines. 
Before the court may depart from the applicable sentencing range 
on a ground not identified for departure either in the presentence 
report or in a party’s prehearing submission or in a victim impact 
statement, the court must give the parties reasonable notice that it 
is contemplating such a departure. The notice must specify any 
ground on which the court is contemplating a departure. The 
attorney for the government or for the victim shall advise defense 
counsel and the court of any ground identified by the victim that 
might reasonably serve as a basis for departure. 
(i) Sentencing. 
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(1) In General. At sentencing, the court: 
(A) must verify that the defendant and the defendant’s 
attorney have read and discussed the presentence report 
and any addendum to the report; 
(B) must give to the defendant and an attorney for the 
government a written summary of—or summarize in 
camera—any information excluded from the presentence 
report under Rule 32(d)(3) on which the court will rely in 
sentencing, and give them a reasonable opportunity to 
comment on that information; 
(C) must allow the parties’ attorneys and any victims to 
comment on the probation officer’s determinations and 
other matters relating to an appropriate sentence; and 
(D) may, for good cause, allow a party or any victim to 
make a new objection at any time before sentence is 
imposed. 
(2) Introducing Evidence; Producing a Statement. The court 
may permit the parties or the victim to introduce evidence on 
the objections. If a witness testifies at sentencing, Rule 
26.2(a)–(d) and (f) applies. If a party fails to comply with a 
Rule 26.2 order to produce a witness’s statement, the court 
must not consider that witness’s testimony. 
(3) Court Determinations. At sentencing, the court: 
(A) may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence 
report as a finding of fact; 
(B) must—for any disputed portion of the presentence 
report or other controverted matter—rule on the dispute 
or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the 
matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will 
not consider the matter in sentencing; and 
(C) must append a copy of the court’s determinations 
under this rule to any copy of the presentence report made 
available to the Bureau of Prisons. 
The Rationale: 
For the reasons explained in the preceding section, the victim’s 
right to be “reasonably heard” at a sentencing hearing encompasses 
the right to be heard on Sentencing Guidelines issues. Congress 
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intended that the victim become a participant in the process with 
rights “independent of the Government or the defendant.”273 Those 
independent rights include the opportunity to make “sentencing 
recommendations.”274 Given that matters in the presentence report 
may often determine what effect a sentencing recommendation will 
have, the victim’s right presumably extends to participating in the 
process that determines the Guideline range. 
The changes in Rule 32 noted above simply incorporate the 
victim in the Guidelines process. Changing the rule in this fashion 
would also clarify the appropriate sequencing of sentencing hearings. 
Rule 32(i) already allows the victim to submit “any information” 
about the sentencing.275 Yet if the experience in my court is any 
guide, the victim’s allocution frequently occurs only after the court 
has decided all the issues surrounding the presentence report. For 
the victim’s right to provide information to the court to truly have 
meaning, the victim’s information must be presented early enough 
to potentially affect critical sentencing issues, including issues about 
Guidelines calculations. 
As with the changes discussed in the previous section, changes in 
the Sentencing Guidelines Manual are also required here. The 
Advisory Committee also should coordinate with the Sentencing 
Commission to ensure that its actions are consistent. 
Rule 32(i)(4)—Conforming Amendment to Victims’ 
Right To Be Heard 
The Proposal: 
Rule 32(i)(4) should be amended to conform the definition of 
victim to that found in the CVRA as follows: 
(B) By a Victim. Before imposing sentence, the court must address 
any victim of a the crime of violence or sexual abuse who is present 
at sentencing and must permit the victim to speak or submit any 
information about the sentence. Whether or not the victim is 
 
 273. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).  
 274. Id. 
 275. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(B). 
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present, a victim’s right to address the court may be exercised by 
the following persons if present: 
(i) a parent or legal guardian, if the victim is younger than 18 
years or is incompetent; or 
(ii) one or more family members or relatives the court 
designates, if the victim is deceased or incapacitated. 
The Rationale: 
As noted earlier,276 Rule 32 currently contains a definition of 
“victim” that is narrower than the CVRA’s definition. The simplest 
fix is simply to strike the definition of victim and victim’s 
representative here and include an appropriate definition in Rule 1. 
(New) Rule 43.1—Victim’s Right To Attend Trials 
The Proposal: 
A new rule implementing the victim’s right to be present at trials 
and other proceedings should be added as follows: 
Rule 43.1 Victim’s Presence 
(a) Victim’s Right To Attend. A victim has the right to attend 
any public court proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear 
and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by the victim 
would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at 
that proceeding. Before making any determination to exclude a 
victim, the court shall make every effort to permit the fullest 
attendance possible by the victim and shall consider reasonable 
alternatives to the exclusion of the victim from the criminal 
proceeding. The reasons for any decision to exclude a victim shall 
be clearly stated on the record. 
(b) Proceeding With and Without Notice. The court may 
proceed with a public proceeding without a victim if proper notice 
has been provided to that victim under Rule 10.1. The court may 
proceed with a public proceeding (other than a trial or sentencing) 
 
 276. See discussion supra notes 120–27, 220–23 and accompanying text discussing Rules 
1 and 32(a). 
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without proper notice to a victim only if doing so is in the interest 
of justice, the court provides prompt notice to that victim of the 
court’s action and of the victim’s right to seek reconsideration of 
the action if a victim’s right is affected, and the court ensures that 
notice will be properly provided to that victim for all subsequent 
public proceedings. 
(c) Numerous Victims. If the court finds that the number of 
victims makes it impracticable to accord all of the victims the right 
to be present, the court shall fashion a reasonable procedure to 
facilitate victims’ attendance. 
(d) Right To Be Heard on Victims’ Issues. In addition to rights 
to be heard established elsewhere in these rules, at any public 
proceeding at which a victim has the right to attend, the victim has 
the right to be heard on any matter directly affecting a victim’s 
right. 
The Rationale: 
The rules should reflect the CVRA’s command that victims have 
the right to attend public proceedings in all but the most unusual 
circumstances. The CVRA guarantees victims the right to attend a 
proceeding “unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing 
evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be 
materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that 
proceeding.”277 This is a fundamental right for victims. A crime is 
often a very significant event in the life of a victim, and the trial, too, 
may be extremely important. Victims deserve to see in person 
whether justice is being done and should be exempted from the rule 
requiring trial witnesses to sit outside the courtroom.278 The CVRA 
adopts this approach by 
allow[ing] crime victims, in the vast majority of cases, to attend the 
hearings and trial of the case involving their victimization. This is 
so important because crime victims share an interest with the 
 
 277. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). 
 278. See generally PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 80 
(1982) (urging that victims be able to attend trial); Douglas E. Beloof & Paul G. Cassell, The 
Victim’s Right To Attend the Trial: The Reascendant National Consensus, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 481 (2005) (developing this argument at length). 
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government in seeing that justice is done in a criminal case and this 
interest supports the idea that victims should not be excluded from 
public criminal proceedings, whether these are pretrial, trial, or 
post-trial proceedings.279 
Most states have also adopted language affirming a victim’s right to 
attend court proceedings, including the trial.280 
One way of addressing the victim’s right to attend would be to 
leave the matter to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Federal Rule of 
Evidence 615—the so-called “rule on witnesses”—requires exclusion 
of witnesses with certain exceptions, including the fourth exception 
for “a person authorized by statute to be present.”281 This exception 
was added to cover crime victims,282 who had a right to attend trials 
subject to certain conditions even before the passage of the CVRA.283 
Without the explicit listing of this exception, some trial courts simply 
overlooked the victim’s right to attend—most notoriously in the 
Oklahoma City bombing trial.284 
 279. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 280. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A) (“To preserve and protect victims’ rights to 
justice and due process, a victim of crime has a right: . . . [t]o be present at and, upon request, 
to be informed of all criminal proceedings where the defendant has the right to be present.”); 
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16a (“Any person who is a victim of a criminal act, or such person’s 
designee, legal guardian, or surviving immediate family members if such person is deceased, 
shall have the right to be heard when relevant, informed, and present at all critical stages of the 
criminal justice process.” (emphasis added)); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 (“A crime victim, as 
defined by statute, has the following rights: . . . (4) to be present at all criminal justice 
proceedings . . . .”) (emphasis added); LA. CONST. art. I, § 25 (“As defined by law, a victim of 
crime shall have the right to . . . be present . . . during all critical stages of preconviction . . . 
proceedings . . . .” (emphasis added)); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24 (“Crime victims . . . shall 
have the following rights . . . The right to attend trial and all other court proceedings the 
accused has the right to attend.” (emphasis added)); MISS. CONST. ANN. art. III, § 26A 
(2000) (“Victims of crime . . . shall have the right . . . to be present . . . when authorized by 
law, during public hearings.” (emphasis added)); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32 (“Crime victims, as 
defined by law, shall have the following rights . . . (1) the right to be present at all criminal 
justice proceedings at which the defendant has such right . . . .” (emphasis added)); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 99-43-21 (2000) (“The victim has the right to be present throughout all 
criminal proceedings as defined in Section 99-43-1.” (emphasis added)). See generally Beloof 
& Cassell, supra note 278, (collecting all state statutes and rules pertaining to the victim’s right 
to attend). 
 281. FED. R. EVID. 615(4). 
 282. See FED. R. EVID. 615, Adv. Comm. Notes, 1998 Amendments.  
 283. See 42 U.S.C. § 10606 (1990) (replaced by the CVRA). 
 284. See supra notes 35–58 and accompanying text; Beloof & Cassell, supra note 278, at 
514–17. 
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Merely relying on Rule 615 to protect the victim’s right to 
attend proceedings, however, would be inadequate. First, the 
defendant’s right to attend proceedings is deemed sufficiently 
important to merit treatment in a specific rule in the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure—Rule 43. This proposed victim’s rule, Rule 
43.1, would even-handedly mirror that treatment for victims. 
Second, Federal Rule of Evidence 615 does not comprehensively 
address the victim’s right to attend proceedings. For starters, it 
would seem that the Advisory Committee Notes in the Federal Rules 
of Evidence now need a revision to reference the CVRA. Otherwise, 
judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel might simply be unaware 
that a victim is now “authorized by statute”—the CVRA—to be 
present.285 Even if legal professionals realize the CVRA’s 
ramifications, most crime victims are not lawyers and lack experience 
in the criminal justice system. Therefore, their rights need to be laid 
out in the most direct manner possible by listing their right to attend 
any public court proceeding in the criminal rules. 
Finally, providing the details of the victim’s right to attend is 
important for practical reasons. The CVRA qualifies the victim’s 
right to attend by requiring exclusion in those rare cases when the 
victim’s testimony “would be materially altered if the victim heard 
other testimony at that proceeding.”286 The CVRA, however, 
contains additional procedural requirements that judges must follow 
before excluding a victim in such situations: “Before making a 
determination . . . [to exclude a victim], the court shall make every 
effort to permit the fullest attendance possible by the victim and shall 
consider reasonable alternatives to the exclusion of the victim from 
the criminal proceeding.”287 Presumably, these reasonable 
alternatives include having the victim testify first and then watching 
all the following witnesses testify,288 something judges are authorized 
to require.289 The Act also requires that “[t]he reasons for any 
decision denying relief under this chapter shall be clearly stated on 
 285. The current Advisory Committee Notes reference the old Victims Rights Act, which 
contains a narrower formulation of the victim’s right to attend than found in the CVRA. See 
Beloof & Cassell, supra note 278, at 514–19. 
 286. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). 
 287. Id. § 3771(b). 
 288. See Beloof & Cassell, supra note 278, at 540–43 (discussing this approach). 
 289. See FED. R. EVID. 611(a) (judge controls “order” of evidence). 
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the record.”290 These procedural requirements are new and 
potentially complex. Moreover, issues surrounding victim attendance 
at criminal proceedings are likely to occur frequently. Victims can 
appeal any exclusion order, and appellate courts must take up those 
appeals expeditiously.291 Accordingly, it is important that lawyers, 
judges, and victims have the new rule and its procedural 
requirements at their fingertips, rather than being forced to dig it 
out through some cross-reference to the United States Code. For all 
these reasons, subsection (a) of the proposed rule simply tracks 
verbatim the substantive and procedural requirements of the CVRA. 
Proposed Rule 43.1(a) also limits the victim’s right to attend 
“public” proceedings. It is clear that the CVRA intended to make no 
change in the circumstances in which proceedings could be closed to 
the public. As Senators Kyl and Feinstein explained in a colloquy 
regarding the law: “[T]he Government or the defendant can request, 
and the court can order, judicial proceedings to be closed under 
existing laws. This provision [of the CVRA] is not intended to alter 
those laws or their procedures in any way . . . .”292 
Proposed Rule 43.1(b) turns to the potentially complex subject 
of whether the court may go forward with a proceeding when the 
victim is not present. Of course, if the victim has been properly 
notified but has elected not to attend the proceeding, no problem 
arises. The difficult issue is what to do when the victim is absent 
because of lack of notice of the proceeding. It could be argued that 
the court has no choice but to reschedule such a proceeding, just as 
it would be required to reschedule a proceeding when the defendant 
had not received notice. The CVRA mandates that courts “shall 
ensure” that crime victims are accorded their rights,293 and one of 
the rights is notice for court proceedings.294 If the victim has not 
received notice of a proceeding, then going forward with the 
proceeding arguably violates the victim’s rights under the CVRA. As 
Senator Kyl explained: 
 290. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(b). 
 291. Id. § 3771(d)(3). 
 292. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (colloquy between Sen. Kyl and 
Sen. Feinstein) (explaining that “[i]n this regard, it is not our intent to alter 28 C.F.R. Sec. 
50.9 in any respect”).  
 293. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(b). 
 294. Id. § 3771(a)(2). 
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It does not make sense to enact victims’ rights that are rendered 
useless because the victim never knew of the proceeding at which 
the right had to be asserted. Simply put, a failure to provide notice 
of proceedings at which a right can be asserted is equivalent to a 
violation of the right itself.295 
Proposed Rule 43.1(b) stakes out a position more limited than 
an absolute requirement of proper victim notification. Except for 
trials and sentencings (which are discussed below), proposed Rule 
43.1(b) would allow the court to move forward with a proceeding 
without notice to the victim provided that three conditions are met: 
(1) doing so is in the interests of justice, (2) the court provides 
prompt notice to the victim of the court’s action and of the victim’s 
right to seek reconsideration of the action if a victim’s right is 
affected, and (3) the court ensures that notice will be properly 
provided to the victim for all subsequent public proceedings. 
Each of these three conditions serves an important purpose. To 
begin with, the court should not go forward unless the interests of 
justice are served—the first requirement. The court should also 
notify the victim of the opportunity to seek reconsideration of the 
court’s action if a victim’s right is affected—the second requirement. 
For example, if the court holds a bail hearing without proper notice 
to the victim and decides to release a defendant, the victim should be 
advised of this fact and of the right to ask the court to reconsider 
that bail decision. (The CVRA, as noted earlier, gives victims the 
right to provide information regarding bail decisions.296) Finally, if 
the court is moving forward without proper notice to a victim at a 
particular proceeding, it seems only fair that the problem be solved 
for future proceedings—the third requirement. 
For two important proceedings—trial and sentencing—the 
proposed rule would bar a court from moving forward without 
proper notice to the victim. This is consistent with the CVRA’s 
directive that “in any court proceeding involving an offense against a 
crime victim, the court shall ensure that the crime victim is afforded 
the rights [in the CVRA].”297 If the victim has not been notified of a 
 295. 150 CONG. REC. S10,910 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 296. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4) (discussed at supra notes 104–10 and accompanying 
text). 
 297. Id. § 3771(b) (emphasis added). 
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trial or sentencing, the only way the court can “ensure” that the 
victim’s right is protected is to delay the trial or sentencing until the 
victim receives notice. This is entirely appropriate; a victim of a crime 
deserves the opportunity to see the trial of her victimizer and to 
speak at sentencing. A modest delay in these proceedings is a small 
price to pay for respecting the victim’s rights. Moreover, neither a 
trial nor a sentencing can be repeated. Double jeopardy principles 
may well forbid retrial even when a victim has received no notice,298 
and the CVRA itself bars a new trial remedy.299 Sentencings would 
appear to be subject to limitations that might prevent a crime victim 
from obtaining a resentencing300—although the CVRA directly 
allows for re-sentencings in certain limited circumstances.301 
While neither trial nor sentencing could proceed without proper 
notice to the victim, this restriction will affect only a small number of 
cases for a short period of time. Many federal cases lack a specifically 
identifiable victim (e.g., drug and immigration offenses) and thus are 
not covered by the CVRA. In those cases with a victim, a significant 
percentage of victims may waive any right to receive notice. In cases 
where victims choose to receive notice, presumably the notice will be 
properly given the vast majority of the time. Even apart from notice 
requirements, most victims will be trial witnesses and therefore will 
have been notified of the trial by a subpoena. Victims will also often 
be aware of sentencings through the work of probation officers in 
preparing presentence reports.302 In the tiny fraction of cases where 
notice has not been properly provided, notice will often be only a 
 298. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ 
Rights, supra note 16, at 303–04 (discussing double jeopardy barriers to remedying violations 
of victim’s rights). 
 299. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(5). 
 300. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(c) (correction of sentence allowed only for technical or 
other clear error). Whether denial of a victim’s right constitutes “clear error” subject to 
correction presumably will need to be resolved in future cases. Cf. United States v. Bedonie, 
413 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 2005) (remedying error in restitution award not permitted after 
imposition of sentence). 
 301. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(5) (authorizing a victim motion to “re-open a . . . sentence” 
if the victim’s right to be heard was denied); see 150 CONG. REC. S10,910 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 
2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (discussing this provision). In light of these provisions, the 
Advisory Committee may need to consider redrafting Rule 35 to allow reopening of sentences 
imposed in violation of victims’ rights.  
 302. See supra notes 231–34 and accompanying text (discussing probation officers 
collecting victim information for presentence reports). 
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telephone call away. While the burdens of delaying a trial or 
sentencing are not trivial, Congress has determined that the victim’s 
rights must take precedence. Proposed subsection (b) faithfully 
implements that determination. 
Subsection (c) of the proposed rule deals with the victim’s right 
to attend in situations involving multiple victims. Congress has 
recognized that in some cases, such as the Oklahoma City bombing 
case, it is impossible to afford all victims the opportunity to attend 
trials. Accordingly, the CVRA provides that where “the number of 
crime victims makes it impracticable” to protect rights for all victims, 
the court “shall fashion a reasonable procedure” to give effect to 
victims’ interests.303 Possible procedures include closed-circuit 
transmission of the proceedings to a ceremonial courtroom, 
auditorium, or other facility that can accommodate many people. To 
permit such transmission, an amendment to Rule 53 is proposed 
below.304 
Subsection (d) gives victims a general right to be heard on issues 
“directly affecting” their rights. The CVRA specifically mandates that 
victims have the right to be heard with regard to release of the 
defendant, a plea, or a sentence.305 The right to be heard at these 
hearings has been addressed elsewhere in these proposed rules,306 but 
courts will sometimes consider other issues that directly affect 
victims’ rights. For example, courts may consider whether to release 
the address and telephone number of the victim to the defendant.307 
It makes little sense for the court to decide this issue without hearing 
from the victim, particularly since the CVRA gives victims the right 
“to be reasonably protected from the accused.”308 Subsection (d) 
would cover such situations by allowing victims who are present at a 
hearing to be heard on issues “directly” affecting their rights. 
 303. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(2). 
 304. See infra notes 340–42 and accompanying text. 
 305. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4) (discussed at supra notes 104, 230 and accompanying 
text). 
 306. See supra note 296 and accompanying text (bail hearings); supra note 110 and 
accompanying text (plea hearings); supra note 275 and accompanying text (sentencing 
hearings). 
 307. See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text (discussing changes to Rule 12.1). 
 308. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(1). 
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Rule 44.1—Discretionary Appointment of Counsel for Victim 
The Proposal: 
The court’s discretionary authority to appoint counsel for a 
victim should be included in a new rule as follows: 
Rule 44.1 Counsel for Victims. 
When the interests of justice require, the court may appoint 
counsel for a victim to assist the victim in exercising his or her 
rights. 
The Rationale: 
An argument could be made that the CVRA guarantees crime 
victims the right to appointed counsel. After all, the CVRA 
guarantees victims the right to be “treated with fairness” and fairness 
can be understood as embracing the assistance of counsel.309 But on 
closer examination, it becomes clear that nothing in the CVRA 
directly mandates counsel for victims. As Senator Kyl explained, 
“This bill does not provide victims with a right to counsel but 
recognizes that a victim may enlist counsel on their own.”310 
While the CVRA does not require judges to appoint counsel for 
victims, nothing in it prevents judges from doing so in appropriate 
cases, particularly under prevailing case law demonstrating that 
federal courts have inherent authority to make such appointments. 
Because this authority may not be well known to judges (or to 
victims), the authority should be clearly laid out in the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. 
A number of federal courts have recognized inherent judicial 
authority to appoint lawyers for indigent litigants in both civil and 
criminal cases.311 While these cases do not directly involve 
 
 309. Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (discussing “fairness” to the 
defendant as a reason for recognizing a right to appointed counsel). 
 310. 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 311. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (holding, in a capital case, that 
courts have the power to appoint counsel and that “[a]ttorneys are officers of the court, and 
are bound to render service when required by such an appointment”); United States v. Bertoli, 
994 F.2d 1002, 1015–18 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the court has inherent power to order 
defendant’s retained law firm to remain as standby counsel at a criminal trial when defendant 
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appointment of counsel for crime victims, their principles clearly 
apply to victims. Illustrative of these decisions is the thoughtful 
analysis by the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska in 
Bothwell v. Republic Tobacco Co.312 Bothwell presented four grounds 
for its holding that courts have inherent power to appoint attorneys 
to represent indigent litigants: 
1) courts possess the inherent power to bring to their assistance 
those “instruments” necessary to ensure a “fair and just” 
adjudicative process in individual cases; 2) in many, if not most, 
cases, due to the adversarial nature of our system, lawyers are a 
necessary component in ensuring such a “fair and just” process; 3) 
to a significant degree, neither the private marketplace nor public 
or charitable efforts provide indigent litigants with adequate access 
to legal assistance; and 4) to that extent, such failure threatens the 
reliability of the results of the adversarial process.313 
These grounds readily apply to appointing attorneys for indigent 
victims when important rights under the CVRA are at stake. Without 
elects to represent himself pro se); United States v. Accetturo, 842 F.2d 1408, 1412–16 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (holding that courts have inherent power to appoint counsel during a criminal trial 
proceeding but that the power does not extend to appointing lawyers licensed in other states); 
United States v. Bowe, 698 F.2d 560, 566–67 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that a court has 
inherent authority to appoint counsel for an indigent witness who may incriminate herself 
during testimony in a criminal case); Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1212–16 (8th 
Cir. 1982) (upholding a state court judge’s appointment of pro bono counsel in criminal case as 
constitutional although noting that forcing an attorney to advance his own funds may be 
unconstitutional); Tyler v. Lark, 472 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1973) (noting that in civil 
rights cases, “representation of indigents upon court order has been a traditional obligation of 
the lawyer which he assumes when he becomes a member of the bar”); Dolan v. United States, 
351 F.2d 671, 672 (5th Cir. 1965) (holding, in a criminal case, that lawyers implicitly consent 
to be appointed by courts pro bono when accepting a license to practice law); United States v. 
Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635–36 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding, in a criminal case, that there is “an 
obligation on the part of the legal profession to represent indigents upon court order, without 
compensation”). But cf. Colbert v. Rickmon, 747 F. Supp. 518, 527 (W.D. Ark. 1990) 
(holding that courts have no inherent power to order attorneys to represent indigent clients). 
See generally Jerry L. Anderson, Court-Appointed Counsel: The Constitutionality of 
Uncompensated Conscription, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503 (1989) (discussing the trend 
against requiring lawyers to take uncompensated court appointments); Bruce Andrew Green, 
Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Legal 
Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 366 (1981) (discussing the constitutionality of pro bono court 
appointments); Judy E. Zelin, Court Appointment of Attorney To Represent, Without 
Compensation, Indigent in Civil Action, 52 A.L.R. 4th 1063 (1987 & Supp. 2004). 
 312. 912 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Neb. 1995). 
 313. Id. at 1229.  
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an attorney to press her claims, a victim may be unable to obtain a 
“fair and just” adjudicative process.314 Moreover, crime victim 
representation appears to be a prime example of a situation where 
“neither the private marketplace nor public or charitable efforts 
provide indigent litigants with adequate access to legal assistance.”315 
No financial incentive will drive lawyers to represent victims in 
criminal cases.316 And while pro bono representation for victims is 
expanding,317 it still falls far short of the needs of victims in the 
federal system. The fourth and final requirement—that the failure of 
attorneys to represent the indigent client threatens the reliability of 
the system—is also present where rights under the CVRA are at 
stake. Neither the prosecutor nor the defendant has a personal stake 
in the victim’s rights, and, frequently, they will have other priorities 
and interests that may even be adverse to the rights of the victim.318 
Accordingly, courts have inherent authority to appoint counsel to 
represent indigent victims and, indeed, may even be able to require 
 314. See generally John W. Gillis & Douglas Beloof, The Next Step for a Maturing Victim 
Rights Movement: Enforcing Crime Victim Rights in the Courts, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 689, 
692 (2002).  
 315. Bothwell, 912 F. Supp. at 1229. 
 316. See Gillis & Beloof, supra note 314, at 698–700.  
 317. See infra note 324 and accompanying text (discussing funding in the CVRA for the 
National Crime Victims Law Institute and other legal clinics for victims). 
 318. See Gillis & Beloof, supra note 314, at 692. 
A_CASSELL.FIN 10/24/2005 6:31 PM 
835] Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules  
 915 
 
counsel to serve without compensation.319 The local rules of some 
federal courts already explicitly recognize this power.320 
In addition to this inherent authority, federal courts appear to 
possess statutory authority to make such an appointment. Title 28 
broadly permits the court in both civil and criminal cases to “request 
an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.”321 
Moreover, at least one statute already directly authorizes federal 
courts to appoint counsel for child victims in certain cases. Title 18 
U.S.C. § 3509 provides, “The court may appoint a guardian ad litem 
for a child who was a victim of, or a witness to, a crime involving 
abuse or exploitation to protect the best interests of the child.” 
Congress, however, has not yet provided funding for this particular 
right.322 Finally, in unusual circumstances where a crime victim may 
also face possible criminal charges of his or her own, the Criminal 
Justice Act would authorize appointment of and payment for defense 
counsel.323 
Proposed Rule 44.1 would confirm the existing discretionary 
power of the courts to appoint volunteer counsel. The rule is purely 
discretionary (the court “may” appoint counsel) and is limited to 
 319. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307 & n.8 (1989) (leaving open the 
question of whether federal courts possess the inherent authority to require counsel to provide 
legal services to the poor). Several lower courts have concluded that appointment without 
compensation is proper. See Bothwell, 912 F. Supp. at 1230–34 (counsel have a duty to serve 
without compensation); Family Division Trial Lawyers of the Superior Court-D.C. v. Moultrie, 
725 F.2d 695, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting argument that pro bono appointment violates 
the Thirteenth Amendment because attorneys can take steps to avoid the pro bono 
appointments and holding that pro bono court appointments are not per se “takings,” as 
accepting court ordered representation of indigents is a condition of receiving a law license, 
but excessive burden could present takings problem); Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 
1211, 1211 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that pro bono service is a voluntary obligation undertaken 
by attorneys when they apply for a license to practice law); Tyler v. Lark, 472 F.2d 1077, 
1079–80 (8th Cir. 1973) (no takings problem with appointment); United States v. Dillon, 
346 F.2d 633, 635–36 (9th Cir. 1965) (no taking problems with appointment). But see State 
ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 759–70 (Mo. 1985) (questioning power of courts to 
appoint counsel without providing compensation).  
 320. See, e.g., D. UTAH CIV. R. 83-1.1(b)(3) (1997) (“Any attorney who is admitted to 
the bar of this court must agree, as a condition of such admission, to engage in a reasonable 
level of pro bono work when requested to do so by the court.”). 
 321. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 322. Memorandum from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to the 
United States District Court Judges and the United States Magistrate Judges (March 19, 
1991) (available from the Administrative Office).  
 323. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(1). 
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situations where the interests of justice require appointment. The 
rule does not address payment for counsel, as this matter must be left 
to subsequent appropriations from Congress. The court, however, 
can ask for volunteer counsel to assist victims on a pro bono basis. 
There is reason to expect that some attorneys will volunteer. Not 
only are many attorneys willing to undertake pro bono 
representation, but the CVRA itself authorizes millions of dollars in 
funding for victim representation around the country. The 
authorization includes support for the National Crime Victims Law 
Institute at the Northwestern School of Law at Lewis and Clark 
College to help establish eleven legal offices around the country 
representing crime victims.324 
Finally, it might be argued that it is unnecessary to address this 
subject in a rule because the court’s inherent authority to appoint 
counsel exists even without a rule. Both courts and victims, however, 
will find it useful to have this authority spelled out in the criminal 
rules to eliminate any lingering doubt. In addition, the CVRA 
obliges prosecutors to eliminate any lingering doubt in the event of 
any material conflict of interest between the prosecutor and the 
victim by “advis[ing] the crime victim that the crime victim can seek 
the advice of an attorney.”325 This requirement may frequently 
require prosecutors to help victims obtain legal counsel. Accordingly, 
a separate rule on this subject is appropriate. 
For all these reasons, the rules should be amended to recognize 
the court’s authority to appoint volunteer counsel to represent a 
crime victim. 
 324. See 42 U.S.C. 10603(d) (2000); see also 150 CONG. REC. S4266 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 
2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (noting appropriations for the National Crime Victims Law 
Institution “to provide grants and assistance to lawyers to help victims of crime in court” with 
funding sufficient to “provide for two new regional offices and nine specific clinics”). For more 
information on NCVLI, see http://www.ncvli.org. 
 325. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(c)(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). 
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Rule 46—Victims’ Right To Be Heard Regarding Defendant’s  
Release from Custody 
The Proposal: 
Victims should be explicitly given the right to be heard regarding 
the defendant’s release from custody as follows: 
(k) Victims’ Right To Be Heard. A victim has the right to be 
heard regarding any decision to release the defendant. The court 
shall consider the views of victims in making any release decision, 
including such decisions in petty cases. In a case where the court 
finds that the number of victims makes it impracticable to accord 
all of the victims the right to be heard in open court, the court shall 
fashion a reasonable procedure to facilitate hearing from 
representative victims. 
The Rationale: 
The CVRA guarantees victims the right “to be reasonably heard” 
at “any public proceeding . . . involving release.”326 A similar right 
already exists for victims of stalking offenses.327 This proposed rule 
simply recognizes a victim’s right “to be reasonably heard” and 
further directs the court to consider the victim’s input. The victim’s 
right to be heard would be meaningless if the court did not consider 
the victim’s views. Moreover, existing law appears to recognize that 
the court should consider the victim’s concerns.328 
Rule 48—Victims’ Views on Dismissal To Be Considered 
The Proposal: 
The court should be required to consider the views of victims in 
deciding whether to grant a government motion to dismiss charges 
as follows: 
 
 
 326. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4). 
 327. 18 U.S.C. § 2263. 
 328. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (court to consider whether release of the defendant 
“will endanger the safety of any other person”).  
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Rule 48. Dismissal 
(a) By the Government. The government may, with leave of 
court, dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint. The 
government may not dismiss the prosecution during trial without 
the defendant’s consent. In deciding whether to grant the 
government’s motion to dismiss, the court shall consider the views 
of any victims. 
The Rationale: 
This proposed change would implement a victim’s right to be 
“treated with fairness” and to be heard at any proceeding “involving 
release” of the defendant by requiring the court to consider the 
views of the victim before granting a government motion to dismiss 
a charge. The rule already requires leave of court before a dismissal 
can be approved. In determining whether to grant leave, the court 
should consider whether dismissal is “clearly contrary to manifest 
public interest.”329 Among the relevant factors in making this public 
interest determination is whether the prosecution’s motion to 
dismiss is motivated by “animus towards the victim.”330 The 
proposed rule would simply require the court to consider the views 
of the victim in making this determination, leaving the weight to 
afford those views up to the court. 
Rule 50—Victims’ Right to Proceedings Free from  
Unreasonable Delay 
The Proposal: 
A victim’s right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay 
should be recognized as follows: 
 
Rule 50. Prompt Disposition 
(a) Scheduling Preference. Scheduling preference must be given 
to criminal proceedings as far as practicable. 
 
 329.  United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 330. In re Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 787 (3d Cir. 2000).  
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(b) Defendant’s Right Against Delay. The court shall assure that 
the defendant’s right to a speedy trial is protected, as provided by 
the Speedy Trial Act. 
(c) Victim’s Right Against Delay. The court shall assure that a 
victim’s right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay is 
protected. A victim has the right to be heard regarding any motion 
to continue any proceeding. If the court grants a motion to 
continue over the objection of a victim, the court shall state its 
reasons in the record. 
The Rationale: 
Under the CVRA, a victim has a right “to proceedings free from 
unreasonable delay.”331 A number of states have similar provisions.332 
 
 331. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(7). Even before the adoption of the CVRA, child victims 
had the right to a “speedy trial” in certain situations. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(j). 
 332. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4435 (2001) (“In any criminal proceeding in which 
a continuance is requested, the court shall consider the victim’s views and the victim’s right to 
a speedy trial.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1050(a) (2005) (stating policy of the California 
legislation that “[e]xcessive continuances . . . cause substantial hardship to victims and other 
witnesses . . . . It is therefore recognized that the people, the defendant, and the victims and 
other witnesses have the right to an expeditious disposition . . . .”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 
9423 (2001) (“In ruling on any motion or other request for a delay or continuance . . . the 
court shall consider and give weight to any adverse impact such delay or continuance might 
have on the well-being of any victim . . . .”); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4-3.1(c) (West 
2005) (“[V]ictim shall be notified of the date and time of hearing [on any motion for 
continuance] and shall be provided an opportunity to address the court on the impact the 
continuance may have on the victim’s well-being.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844 (1999) 
(“When ruling on a defense motion for continuance, the court shall consider the impact on the 
victim.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-43-19 (2000) (“[T]he court . . . should make every 
reasonable effort to consider whether granting [a] continuance shall be prejudicial to the 
victim.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-11.2 (2000) (“[T]he court shall consider any adverse 
impact the delay or continuance may have on the well-being of the victim . . . .”); TENN. 
CODE § 40-38-116(a) (2003) (“In any criminal proceeding in which a continuance is 
requested, the court shall consider the victim’s views and the victim’s right to a speedy trial. If 
the continuance is granted over the victim’s objection, the court shall state on the record the 
reason for the continuance and the procedures that have been taken to avoid further delays.”); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-207 (2004) (“The court shall consider the victim’s interest and 
circumstances when . . . granting or denying continuances.”).  
Some states limit speedy trial rights to child victims. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-6 
(2000) (“In ruling on any motion . . . for . . . continuance . . . the court shall consider and 
give weight to any adverse impact the delay or continuance may have on the well-being of a 
child victim or witness.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 5133 (2001) (same); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 19-110 (2004) (same); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.510 (LexisNexis 1992) (same); 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 642-a (2005) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-35-05 (2003) (same); 
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The proposed rule would give effect to this right. Of course, in 
some situations, delay is reasonable. In others, however, the court 
should deny a motion to continue in order to wrap up the 
proceedings and possibly bring closure to a victim. As Senator 
Feinstein has explained, 
This provision does not curtail the government’s need for 
reasonable time to organize and prosecute its case. Nor is the 
provision intended to infringe on the defendant’s due process right 
to prepare a defense. Too often, however, delays in criminal 
proceedings occur for the mere convenience of the parties and 
those delays reach beyond the time needed for defendant’s due 
process or the government’s need to prepare. The result of such 
delays is that victims cannot begin to put the crime behind them 
and they continue to be victimized. It is not right to hold crime 
victims under the stress and pressure of future court proceedings 
merely because it is convenient for the parties or the court.333 
The proposed rule gives victims a right against unreasonable 
delay in subsection (c). To ensure that defendants’ rights are 
reasonably protected, a new subsection (b) is added recognizing 
defendants’ rights in the Speedy Trial Act.334 The existing rule’s 
direction to give scheduling preference to criminal cases would 
remain in subsection (a). 
The proposal also gives victims the right to be heard on any 
continuance. This is consistent with the drafters’ intent, as at least 
one court has already opined.335 As Senator Kyl stated, “This 
provision [in the CVRA] should be interpreted so that any decision 
to schedule, reschedule, or continue criminal cases should include 
victim input through the victim’s assertion of the right to be free 
from unreasonable delay.”336  
WIS. STAT. § 971.105 (2005) (same). For general review of the victim’s right to a speedy trial, 
see generally BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 15, at 383–91; Cassell, Balancing the 
Scales of Justice, supra note 15, at 1406. 
 333. 150 CONG. REC. S4268–69 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
 334. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174. 
 335. United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 334 n.14 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(recognizing victim’s “participatory right” with respect to delays in a criminal case). 
 336. 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) 
(emphasis added).  
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The proposed rule also requires that the court state its reason for 
granting any continuance. This requirement stems from a 
recommendation from the President’s Task Force on Victims of 
Crime, which noted “the inherent human tendency to postpone 
matters, often for insufficient reason,” and accordingly 
recommended that “reasons for any granted continuance . . . be 
clearly stated on the record.”337 Several states have adopted similar 
provisions.338 
Rule 51—Claiming Error Regarding Victims’ Rights 
The Proposal: 
The procedures for a victim to assert error should be spelled out 
in the rules as follows: 
Rule 51. Preserving Claimed Error 
(a) Exceptions Unnecessary. Exceptions to rulings or orders of 
the court are unnecessary. 
(b) Preserving a Claim of Error. A party or a victim may preserve 
a claim of error by informing the court—when the court ruling or 
order is made or sought—of the action the party wishes the court 
to take, or the party’s objection to the court’s action and the 
grounds for that objection. If a party or a victim does not have an 
opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the absence of an 
objection does not later prejudice that party. A ruling or order that 
admits or excludes evidence is governed by Federal Rule of 
Evidence 103. 
The Rationale: 
The CVRA authorizes victim appeals and includes procedures for 
expedited handling of those appeals.339 The proposed rule would 
 
 337. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 76 (1982). 
 338. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4435(B) (2001) (courts required to “state on 
the record the reason for [any] continuance”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-7(3)(b) (2004) 
(court required to “enter in the record the specific reason for the continuance and the 
procedures that have been taken to avoid further delays”). 
 339. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2005). 
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incorporate victims into the existing rule regarding preservation of 
errors. 
Rule 53—Closed-Circuit Transmission of Proceedings for Victims 
The Proposal: 
Closed-circuit transmission of court proceedings for victims 
should be authorized as follows: 
Rule 53. Courtroom Photographing and Broadcasting 
Prohibited 
(a) General Rule. Except as otherwise provided by a statute or 
these rules, the court must not permit the taking of photographs in 
the courtroom during judicial proceedings or the broadcasting of 
judicial proceedings from the courtroom. 
(b) Closed-Circuit Transmission for Victims. In order to permit 
victims of crime to watch criminal trial proceedings, the court may 
authorize closed-circuit televising of the proceedings for viewing by 
victims or other persons the court determines have a compelling 
interest in doing so. 
The Rationale: 
The CVRA grants victims the right to attend trials, as noted 
previously in connection with proposed Rule 43.1.340 At the same 
time, however, the CVRA recognizes that in situations with 
numerous victims, the court may have to craft “a reasonable 
procedure” to protect victims’ rights.341 One such reasonable 
procedure would appear to be closed-circuit transmission of court 
proceedings to a facility sufficiently large to accommodate all the 
victims. This was the procedure followed in the Oklahoma City 
bombing case.342 
 
 340. See supra notes 277–308 and accompanying text. 
 341. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(2). 
 342. See Paul G. Cassell & Robert F. Hoyt, The Tale of Victims’ Rights, LEGAL TIMES, 
Dec. 23, 1996, at 32; Jo Thomas, Trial to Be Shown in Oklahoma for Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
30, 1997, at A14. 
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The proposed rule would authorize such transmission in 
appropriate cases. The language for the proposed rule comes from 
42 U.S.C. § 10608(a), which authorizes closed-circuit transmissions 
“notwithstanding any provision of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to the contrary” in cases in which a proceeding has been 
transferred more than 350 miles—as was the case with the Oklahoma 
City bombing trial. In light of the CVRA’s mandate that the court 
must always craft “a reasonable procedure” to protect the rights of 
multiple victims, there is no compelling reason to tie the device to 
such geographical circumstances. The proposed rule authorizes 
courts to allow such transmissions in any appropriate case. 
Rule 58—Victims and Petty Offenses 
The Proposal: 
Courts should hear from victims regarding sentences in petty 
cases as follows: 
Rule 58. Petty Offenses and Other Misdemeanors. 
. . . . 
(3) Sentencing. The court must give the defendant an opportunity 
to be heard in mitigation and then proceed immediately to 
sentencing. The court must also give victims an opportunity to be 
heard. The court may, however, postpone sentencing to allow the 
probation service to investigate or to permit either party to submit 
additional information. 
The Rationale: 
The CVRA gives a “victim” the right to be heard at sentencing. 
The CVRA defines “victim” as including anyone who is directly and 
proximately harmed by “a Federal offense.”343 The Act does not limit 
those offenses to felonies or misdemeanors. Accordingly, a victim has 
a right to be heard at sentencing for any petty offense, as would be 
reflected in the proposed rule. 
 
 343. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(e). 
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CONCLUSION 
The CVRA commands that victims be made participants in the 
federal criminal process and thus requires significant changes to the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Article has provided one 
possible and comprehensive way to implement that congressional 
command with specific language and supporting analysis for each 
change. Undoubtedly there are other ways of implementing the 
CVRA. However, since the Advisory Committee will be making 
many decisions about how to best change the rules, one concluding 
thought may be worth highlighting. 
Congress will be paying close attention to how courts protect the 
rights of future victims. Indeed, the CVRA directs the Administrative 
Office for the U.S. Courts to report each year the number of times 
that victims have attempted to assert their rights and been denied the 
requested relief.344 More generally, Congress views the new Act as an 
important step to protecting crime victims—a “new and bolder 
approach, than has ever been tried before in our Federal system.”345 
Congress is eagerly awaiting the results of this approach. As Senator 
Leahy warned, “Passage of this bill will necessitate careful oversight 
of its implementation by Congress.”346 Victims’ advocates, too, will 
be watching carefully. 347 
In light of this thorough and ongoing interest, the judiciary 
should not merely attempt a “quick fix” or minimalist approach to 
implementing the CVRA, but should comprehensively protect crime 
victims’ rights by changes in court rules. If Congress believes that 
the federal rules fail to faithfully reflect crime victims’ concerns, it 
can directly amend the rules. But such direct amendments may not 
sufficiently attend to the needs of the judicial branch or others 
involved in the criminal justice process. It is in that spirit of 
eliminating any need for congressional intervention that this Article 
 344. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771, Historical and Statutory Notes (requiring the Administrative 
Office of the courts to file an annual report with Congress concerning the number of times a 
victim’s right is asserted and denied by federal courts). 
 345. 150 CONG. REC. S4263 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).  
 346. Id. at S4271 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 347. United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that 
victims’ advocates “will be watching to see how federal courts and prosecutors carry out the 
new law’s mandate”).  
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offers proposals to fully and faithfully implement the congressional 
directive that victims be integrated into the criminal justice process. 
In the final analysis, whether the courts or Congress redraft the 
rules is less important than that the redrafting occur. As commanded 
in the CVRA, crime victims are now participants in federal criminal 
cases. That new reality must be reflected throughout the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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